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I.

The Shadow

On the morning of September 27, 1940 the cables hummed with
news of a momentous ceremony. Japanese diplomats in Berlin
had signed a military pact with Germany and Italy. That evening in Tokyo the Japanese people received a message from
Emperor Hirohito. In their newspapers they read: "We are
deeply gratified that a pact has been concluded between these
three powers." The Emperor had spoken. A new alliance had
been formed. And a lengthening shadow was spreading over
Asia.
TEN YEARS AGO AND NOW

The shadow had first been cast on another September day
nearly ten years before, when a railway explosion at Mukden
had served as an excuse for the Japanese military to take over
l\1anchuria. As we look back now with the advantage of hindsight, that day-September 18, 193 I-looms up as an important
milestone. For Japan's seizure of Manchuria ended one historic
era, and began another. It abruptly broke up the period of
comparative peace that had succeeded the first World War.
And it ushered in our present period of strife and unsettlement.
Its indirect effects on European developments were also very
great. We know that Japan's defiance lowered the prestige and
authority of the League of Nations. It showed how hard it was
to secure international cooperation strong enough to check
determined aggression. Japan's example undoubtedly influenced Mussolini and Hitler in the bold moves they made later
on in Europe.
After 1935 German and Italian expansion in Europe paralleled Japan's drive in the Far East. All of these movements
steadily widened their scope. Increasingly these three powers
played into one another's hands, and helped one another's
advance. The anti-Comintern pact of November 1936 drew
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them closer together. But they were not formally allied until
September 27, 1940, when Japan signed the military pact with
the Axis powers.
This pact had startling implications. True, Germany and
Italy were separated from Japan by vast distances. As long as
Britain controlled the seas, the new allies could not actually
join military forces. But Germany had only to put pressure
on the French authorities at Vichy in order to help Japan win
control over Indo-China. An Axis break-through in the Mediterranean, moreover, could swiftly bring her much greater aid.
TOWARD A "NEW ORDER"

It was this possibility that made Japan's aims, as outlined in the
alliance, so significant. Berlin and Rome waved Japan ahead
toward the conquest of "Greater East Asia." Until 1940
Tokyo's official claims had reached out only to Manchuria and
China. But the new term brought southeast Asia into the picture as well. This area would certainly include Indo-China,
Siam, Burma, Malaya, the Dutch East Indies and the Philippines. On its outskirts lie Australia, New Zealand and India.
By formally announcing "Greater East Asia" as Tokyo's sphere
of influence, the Axis-Japan pact served as a blueprint of the
Far Eastern sector of the world order which the Axis alliance
hoped to establish.
WHAT IS "GREATER EAST ASIA"?

The new allies were seeking control over three continents.
Germany and Italy were bidding for domination over Europe,
Africa and the Near East, creating new and urgent problems
for us. Tokyo'S bid for supremacy in "Greater East Asia"
raised problems which were just as great. To many of us these
problems seemed far away-much more remote than those of
Europe, to which we are bound by so many close ties. Yet we
know now that we should be making a mistake if we tried to
close our eyes to them.
8

More than one billion people, or half the earth's population,
live in the area embraced by "Greater East Asia." It is thus one
of the most populous regions of the globe. Its territorial spread
is equally large. Its outside limits range fr0!TI northern Japan
to Australia, and from China and India to New Zealand. The
whole North and South American continents, excluding Canada, could be fitted comfortably into this vast territory.
It is, besides, an area of great contrasts-greater, probably,
than in any other region of the world. In a score of different
localities conditions vary widely-climate, people, language,
religion, economic life, government. Coolies working in Korean
rice fields are a far cry from English-speaking Australian sheep
ranchers, peasants in the remote interior of China from Malayan
tin miners or East Indian rubber planters, Indian bazaars under
a burning sun from Manchurian cities deep in their winter
snows.
A COLONIAL REGION

Another feature of this region became especially important
after Germany had conquered several European powers with
Far Eastern possessions. For eastern Asia is one of the greatest
colonial areas of the world, not even excepting Africa. From
Korea to India runs a continuous chain of Japanese, French,
American, Dutch and British holdings. Only Japan in the
north, and Australia and New Zealand in the south, may be
counted as fully independent countries. So this region is the
scene not only of imperial rivalries, but of struggles for independence on the part of native peoples.
Thus many factors enter into the international developments
affecting this region. Countless threads of policy connect it
with Europe. They run to Berlin, and are woven into Hitler's
plans; to London, where they tie in with the problem of what
naval and air forces the British can spare for the Far East; to
Vichy, and the attitude of the French Government there; and
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to the refugee Netherlands authorities in Britain taking counsel
on the fate of their colonies. Moscow is caught up in this diplomatic network, and so is Washington-their moves can exert
decisive influence on the course of events.
JAPAN PULLS THE STRINGS

Yet the main moving force in Far Eastern developments is
Japan. In fact, Japan has been pulling the strings ever since
September 18, 1931. The challenge to the status quo in East
Asia proceeds from Tokyo, just as in Europe it proceeds from
Berlin. Like Germany, but in even greater measure, Japan has
the strategic advantage of a central position. She need not take
too seriously the protests of European powers halfway across
the globe, and she is well aware that the main centers of
strength in the United States and the Soviet Union are almost
equally distant. Only Japan, of the major powers, has her
home bases wholly within the Far Eastern region.
And so today we are forced to think more and more about
Japan. In large part we are concerned with the immediate
present. We want to know what Japan is doing, and what she
intends to do. Yet we can understand her present foreign policy and form some idea of her probable future moves only if
"\Ive know something of her past as well. We must seek out the
forces that have shaped modern Japan.
So in this book we shall go back to the legendary traditions
of the Japanese nation, today being revived by Japanese patriots
and preached as a state religion. We shall see how the belief in
hereditary power as the privilege of the few has been strong
in Japan from the earliest times, resisting the influence of democratic ideas from both China and the West; how even when
Japan set up a constitutional government, the seats of ancient
privilege were preserved; and how Japan, with her military
leaders in the saddle, finally set out on the road to Empire.

10

II.

Introducing Imperial Japan

Japan proper, consisting of four closely connected islands, has
often been compared to the British Isles. A map of the Eurasian
continent shows the similarity of their geographical position.
Japan's island chain is much longer, but it clings to the Asiatic
mainland very much as the British Isles cling to the European
mainland. The Straits of Tsushima take the place of the English Channel.
Actually, however, Japan is much farther from the mainland
than Britain, even in the narrow waters of Tsushima. The
steamer from Shimonoseki takes nearly eight hours in crossing
over to Fusan, on the tip of the Korean peninsula. This fact
has had important historical results. The stretch of water has
been wide enough to make invasion difficult-at least until modern times. Yet it has not been so wide as to bar cultural
exchanges with the mainland.
JAPAN AND THE ASIATIC MAINLAND

During historic times, for roughly 2,000 years, Japan was never
successfully invaded. In 1066 William the Conqueror successfully invaded England. But two centuries later, in 1274 and
1281, Kublai Khan's Mongol-Chinese armies twice failed to
conquer Japan. For long periods, when Japan's rulers so wished,
they were able to isolate their country more or less completely
from the Asiatic mainland.
On the other hand, Japan was close enough to the continent
to benefit from the earlier growth of civilization there. From
the very beginning of Japanese national life, we can trace significant advances to the coming of peoples and cultures from
the Korean peninsula: At times, notably in the seventh and
eighth centuries, the flood of cultural influences from China
almost swamped Japan and threatened to sweep away her
native institutions. During the past century Western influence
I I

has caused equally great changes in Japanese life. Each time,
however, a solid core of Japanese tradition resisted destruction,
and shaped the new elements into a social pattern characteristically Japanese.
JAPAN'S ISLAND HOME

Many local features of Japan's island home are as important
as its geographical position. Its natural beauties have fed the
highly developed aesthetic sense of the Japanese people. No
one who has traveled the Inland Sea can forget its sparkling
waters, or the lovely islands which dot its surface. The majestic beauty of Mt. Fuji is world famous. Hallowed associations enhance its snow-capped splendor for the Japanese.
Not all characteristics of the group of Japanese islands are so
favorable. Many of its mountains are volcanic in origin. Several volcanoes are still active. Earthquakes occur frequently.
(The disastrous earthquake of 1923, with over 150,000 dead
and injured, is still fresh in our memories.) Typhoons, sweeping in from the sea in destructive assault, are also common. So
nature contributes an element of insecurity to the life of the
Japanese, offsetting the protection their isolation gives them.
Today other natural features give rise to a more serious insecurity. Japan's territory is small, barely the size of California,
the population is large and prolific. Four-fifths of the islands are
so mountainous that they are useless for the intensive rice cultivation which is the principal Japanese agricultural pursuit. In
recent times, when modern industry became necessary, the
Japanese islands were found to lack most minerals. Water
power is abundant, and can be harnessed to produce electricity.
There are considerable reserves of coal, though not of good
coking quality. But there is little iron, and even less of the
minor but still important metals. To these factors, which have
not prevented the Japanese from becoming an industrial nation,
we shall have to return later on.
11

WHO ARE THE JAPANESE?

Like all modern peoples, the Japanese of today are a mixed
race. In prehistoric times one migrant people after another
overran the islands. The ocean set a barrier to further migration. So the invaders had to settle down, either exterminating
the people already there or else intermarrying with them.
The last invasions must have occurred early in the Christian
era. Scholars are not agreed on the exact racial proportions of
the groups which mingled to form the modern Japanese people.
The basic stock is probably Mongolian, the result of migrations
through Korea from the north Asiatic continent. There is
apparently a southern admixture, coming from either southeast
China or Malaysia. Many of these groups were late invaders of

JAPAN'S ISLAND HOME
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the islands. They found there an
Ainu people, possibly of Caucasian racial origin. Ainu remnants
still survive in Japan, but most of
them have been absorbed or exterminated in the course of centuries
of warfare.
Three main racial elements thus
A Magatama, or bead
entered into the making of the
ornament, common in early
Japanese
people. To the Mongol
Japanese
tombs.
Often
made of jade, nephrite
strain is undoubtedly due the waror chrysoprase-materials
like
spirit of the Japanese, while
found not in Japan but in
the Ural-Baikal regions.
from southeast Asia comes a mythology that has been interwoven
with Japan's political institutions. Later, there were also many
Chinese and Korean immigrants. By the end of the seventh
century, according to one source, more than one-third of
Japan's noble families claimed Chinese or Korean descent.
EARLY JAPANESE INSTITUTIONS

To understand modern Japan, we need to study the past even
more than in the case of most Western nations. For survivals
of ancient traditions playa large part in Japan's national life
today. These beliefs and practices can be traced back for
nearly two thousand years. What were these institutions like
in their earliest form?
Historians give only a partial answer to this question. The
latest island invaders, who became the dominant Japanese, were
a group of clans or tribes. Leadership in these clans was hereditary. The clan elder was both chieftain and high priest. He
supervised or performed sacrifices to the clan god, who was
usually held to be his direct ancestor. All clansmen were supposedly united by blood ties to the clan elder, and thus shared
in the divine descent.
14

liTHE WAY OF THE GODS"

Societies ruled by a priest-king, usually called "theocracies,"
have existed in many parts of the world. In Japan, however,
theocracy grew all the stronger because of a mythological tradition, later called Shinto, or "Way of the Gods," centering
about a Sun Goddess (Amaterasu). There were many aspects
to Shinto, including an early nature worship. But its main
feature came to be the story of the Sun Goddess, whose
descendants were the Japanese people. Early in their history the
rulers of Japan raised this myth to the dignity of a state cult.
The chieftain of the Yamato clan, the strongest of all, claimed
direct descent from the Sun Goddess. This claim was a very

EARLY INVADERS AND SETTLERS
Mongols from

Siberia

~~~§AinuSI early mhabitIII.}

ants of the Islands

real thing in Japan. It was taken much more literally than our
vaguer Western idea of "the divine right of kings," which persisted until the eighteenth century in Europe.
The clansmen were aristocrats who handed on their privileges from father to son, and to whom war was second nature.
But agriculture, in the shape of the cultivation of rice, was
already a cornerstone in the economy of this early Japanese
society. Under the clansmen were "guilds" of farmers and artisans, who did most of the productive work. Membership in
these producing units also passed from father to son. These
serfs, as well as a smaller number of actual slaves, were made
up largely of war captives, conquered natives, or immigrants
from Korea.
The chief ideas of this primitive Shinto society are quite
clear. There was a strong emphasis on the hereditary principle.
The idea of an aristocracy of the blood was strengthened by
the idea of descent from the gods. Government was by men,
not by law. The clan or group, not the individual, was important. The mass of the people lived to serve their rulers. We
shall see how these primitive ideas-so like the totalitarian ideas
of" today - have influenced Japanese history through the·
centuries.
BEGINNINGS OF A NATION-STATE

At first the invading clans were not unified. There was little
centralized government. The Yamato chieftain had only a
shadowy authority over the other clans. He was "first among
equals," rather than an overlord. He controlled directly the
territory held by his own clan, but not the lands of other clans.
Nor did his religious authority extend far beyond his own clan.
During the first four or five centuries of the Christian era
this picture was steadily changing. Most of central and western
Japan was conquered and occupied as the result of a long series
of wars. The power of the Yamato clan was growing. Its
16
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chieftain was becoming the ruler of a centralized state. His
position was approaching that of a king. Lesser leaders were
being attached to this "Emperor," and were assuming the role
of ministers at the "court."
In other ways, too, the various clans were merging into a
centralized state. The Emperor, as the direct descendant of the
Sun Goddess, came to be recognized as divine ruler of the
whole Japanese people. More and more the Japanese thought
of themselves as a single patriarchal family, headed by "the
Sovereign that is a manifest God." Ancestors of the other clan
leaders, also divine, were brought into relation with those of the
Emperor, but in subordinate rank. The strongest clans were
able to claim descent from deities closely associated with the
Sun Goddess.

CONQUESTS IN KOREA

These political and religious changes were the outward signs
of an underlying movement of growth and expansion. A larger
and larger area of the islands was being occupied. The population was growing, and additional economic un.its, or "guilds,"
were being formed. Japanese armies were fighting in Korea,
where they dominated the southern region of the peninsul~
for long periods. Through this contact with the mai~and, a
stream of Korean immigrants, and even some Chinese, flowed
into Japan. Many of them were ,educated scribes, Buddhist
priests or expert artisans. By the fifth century the Japanese
had learned the rudiments of Ch~nese writing, and in the sixth
century Buddhism was officially introduced from Korea. The
wealth of Chinese civilization was thus opened up to the
Japanese people.
THE OLD ORDER BREAKS DOWN

By the sixth century, Japan faced new and difficult problems.
Old forms of government were breaking down. The simple
clan rule, based on blood ties, was being upset by migrations
within, and immigration from without. New leaders were faking their family trees, in order to claim divine descent. The
clan chieftains found their priestly control over the people
slipping, and had to try the use of political and military
power instead.
Special difficulties arose when new areas were conquered, or
large numbers of immigrants arrived. There were disputes
between clans, some of which favored "guilds" and some a
freer order of serfs. The Imperial clan proved able to get the
richest of the new areas, and to extend the lands and increase
the people under its control. But this did not settle the problem.
F or the leading clans tried to control the Emperor, and fought
over rival claimants to the throne.
These bitter quarrels threatened to tear the new state apart.
18
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A more effective centralization, both of economic and political
power, had obviously become necessary. The groundwork had
been laid, and the times called for a drastic change. The model
was sought in China, then flourishing under the T' ang Dynasty
(618-907 A.D.).

III.

Imitating the Chinese

One of the most dramatic episodes Qf mQdern histQry has been
Japan's adoption Qf Western institutiQns and techniques. But
the interesting thing is that such whQlesale bQrrQwings were
nQt new in the history Qf Japan. More than a thousand years
earlier she had drawn similarly Qn Chinese civilization. That
earlier period, moreover, was akin to. the later in Qne significant
respect-the Qld Japanese ways persisted under the new shell.
The changes were Qnly .skin-deep. And the mQre important
beliefs and practices that featured- the early clan sQciety we
have been studying cQntinued to. govern Japanese behaviQr.
Japan's contacts with China had begun well before the seventh century, the period when they became so. marked. At first
these contacts had been only secQndhand, through Korea.
Direct relatiQns with China had been established early in the
fifth century, but had remained unofficial. The first Qfficial
Japanese envQY, was sent to the Sui Dynasty in 607 A.D., and
a secQnd embassy followed in 608. In the two. centuries after
630, no. less than twelve Japanese embassies visited the T'ang
court at Ch'ang-an, located Qn the site Qf the mQdern city Qf
Sian (see map opposite) . These two hundred years were
'China's golden age, when dazzling Ch'ang-an was the wQrld's ,
foremost civilized center. Japanese monks and scholars aCCQmpanied the embassies, often remaining in China for IQng periods
Qf study. They brought back to Japan a thorough knQwledge
of Chinese culture-much as Japanese students have returned
frQm Western countries with new knowledge and skills during
the past eighty years Qr so.
CHINA BECOMES THE "GLASS OF FASHION"

Chinese civilization, during the seventh and eighth centuries,
was transplanted to Japan on a vast scale. N ara, the new J apanese capital (see map QPPQsite), was built Qn the lavish model
20

ROUTES TO THE CONTINENT
7-Sth CENTURIES

CHI NA
(T'A N G)

of Ch'ang-an. Court society became highly sophisticated. The
ability to write a good Chinese hand, or turn a Chinese verse,
was the indispensable equipment of an educated man. The first
national histories of Japan were written-most of them in the
Chinese language. Buddhism flourished. Japanese artistic skill
expressed itself in masterpieces of sculpture and architecture,
modeled on T'ang examples but individual in genius and execution. Native Japanese poetry flowered and, in general, this
was the classic age of Japanese culture.
In the field of government the Japanese also imitated the
T 'ang system. They declared the land "nationalized"-or subject only to the Emperor's control. They reorganized local government, putting Imperial officials in direct control, especially
of tax revenues. In China such officials were chosen through an
examination system, so examinations were introduced in Japan.
21

The Emperor was now, in theory at least, the all-po"verful
head of the Japanese state.
BUT IT'S CHINA-"WITH A DIFFERENCE"

These reforms were not amateurish. They were based on a
good knowledge of the principles and practices of the Chinese
system. Yet in their pure Chinese form they worked against
certain ingrained Japanese ideas, most of all the hereditary principle. So, from the beginning, the Japanese changed the Chinese
system as they took it over. The changes may not have seemed
great at the time, but they were really basic. Within a few centuries, the new institutions had produced an entirely different
result in Japan. Only in form did they bear any resemblance
to the institutions of China.
The clearest example of such changes is the way Japan's
statesmen treated the Chinese examination system. In China, at
its best, this was a real civil service system. For centuries the
path to public office lay through success in the examinations.
Sons of great families undoubtedly had a better chance of succeeding, and bribery and favoritism were rife in decadent
periods. But the "success story" of the Horatio Alger type fills
Chines~ literature. In not a few cases, the poor but ' brilliant
Chinese youth passes the examinations with honors, and
becomes a powerful and wealthy official.
THE ARISTOCRAT'S PLACE IN THE SUN

This system was altogether too democratic for japan's clan
society, with its emphasis on aristocratic lineage. At the very
outset it was drastically modified. Training schools were set up,
but only nobles of a certain rank could enter them. These persons alone could take the examinations, find qualify for high
office. After a time, even the examinations were discontinued.
Important government posts soon became herepitary again.
Lower posts in the provinces were usually take~ by local lead22

"Japanese artistic skill expressed itself in )masterpieces of
sculpture ••. modeled on T'ang examples."

ers, instead of officers sent by the Imperial government. The
higher provincial officials meanwhile stayed at court, and
delegated their powers to personal followers in the various
localities.
A similar development took place in the case of the land
reform$. The land was "nationalized," but it proved impossible
to preserve the public domain. The great estates of the clan
leaders were returned to them in payment for their official services, and then remained hereditary. Powerful individuals
encroached on the public lands, or impoverished peasants
escaped tax exactions by joining their lands to privately owned
manors, and becoming serfs. In practice, the public domain
was gradually taken over by private families, the court nobility or the great monasteries.
THE POWER BEHIND THE THRONE

•

As these private estates were usually tax-free, the Imperial government was soon deprived of its revenue. And so, as time went
on, the Emperor became a mere figurehead. Elaborate state
councils and ministries, patterned after those of China, became
nothing more than ceremonial forms. Yet centralization was
maintain~d for several centuries, with the great Fujiwara family as the real power behind the throne. This family held vast
provincial estates, controlled many of the local officials, and
dominated the court. By wedding the Imperial princes to Fujiwara ladies, it reduced the Emperors to puppets. The Fujiwara
dictatorship ruled a much more intricate and cultured society
than had existed in the early clan period. On the surface, this
new society was Chinese; in fact, it was still run in the old
Japanese way.
Changes there had been, however. The courtier had replaced
the warrior. Instead of fighting clan chieftains, a bureaucracy
of civilians now ruled. Buddhism had pervaded Japanese society
from top to bottom. The teachings of Confucius had also been

1\

introduced from China. F or a time the home-grown Shinto
religion was overshadowed, and lay dormant. But it was not
wholly eclipsed. The Emperor reigned, if he did not rule.
Though the Shinto ritual, playing up the Emperor's descent
from the Sun Goddess, might be neglected, it was never lost.
Japanese government was still theocratic (centering on a priestking), even if a Fujiwara pulled the strings and bureaucrats
played all the active roles.

IV.

Japan Bars Her Door

We must now leap several centuries to about 1550, when the
first Western traders and missionaries reached Japan.
The Japan of 1550 differed greatly from the Japan of the
Fujiwara era we left behind us five or six centuries earlier.
The Fujiwara power had passed away in the twelfth century.
Its civilian government had grown weak. It could not even
keep the peace. As disorder grew in the provinces, great independent lords surrounded themselves with military retainers on
their private estates. A feudal society gradually emerged. In
1 185 one of these feudal lords established his supremacy over
the others, and soon obtained Imperial appointment as "Shogun," or Generalissimo. The Emperor's court still carried on
at Kyoto, but political control passed increasingly to the Shoguns, who becalne military dictators. A military aristocracybut a rapidly shifting one-dominated Japan. As new feudal
lords grevv in strength, they would challenge the Shogun'S
authority and bitter civil wars would follow. Strife and disorder amounting to anarchy marked the centUry which preceded 1550.
Then the trend was reversed. By 1590, through the work of
three gr~at leaders-N obunaga, Hideyoshi and Ieyasu-the
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country was unified again. In the brief period that followedsay, until 1625-Japan was confronted with a fateful question.
Should it embark on a program of military and commercial
expansion, similar to that which Western nations were just
entering upon? For a time it seemed that the answer might be
"yes." In the end, it was "no." And that "no" changed the
whole course of Far Eastern'and perhaps world history. In 1603
Ieyasu established the T okugawa Shogunate, destined to rule
Japan for more than 250 years. After 1616, under his successors,
the seclusion policy was gradually adopted, and Japan was
practically isolated from the outside world.
Was this choice inevitable? We cannot really tell. We do
know that in the period just before she barred her door Japan
was reaching outward toward full intercourse with the West.
REACHING OUTWARD

F or the last thirty years of the sixteenth century were a
dynamic period in Japanese history. An excess of energy in
Japan seemed to match the urge for discovery and conquest
that stirred the rising nations of Europe.
Japan's domestic and foreign trade had been increasing at a
rapid pace. Native industries had grown, and trade guilds had
flourished. After I 550 this commercial development leaped forward. Sakai, a great trading center, became virtually a free city,
ruled by its merchant princes. Nagasaki was opened to foreign
trade in 1570, and soon developed into a thriving port. At this
time, too, Japanese ships, often on piratical expeditions, were
venturing into the waters of the Philippines and Siam. In groups
and as individuals, Japanese emigrants were found at various
ports in southeast Asia. Hideyoshi even conceived the project
of conquering China, but after overrunning Korea in 1592-93,
his armies (numbering 150,000 men) were defeated.
Mter 1550 missionaries and traders from Portugal, Spain,
Holland and England came to Japan in growing numbers. The
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Japanese eagerly seized upon Western products and technical
advances, notably in firearms and shipbuilding. These commercial contacts with the West ll10dified Japan's economy and
stimulated her industrial development. F or several decades
Christianity, introduced by St. Francis Xavier in 1549-51, was
welcomed. Some of the feudal lords became Christians. By 16 I 7
there were some 300,000 Christian converts, or nearly as many
as today.

JAPAN SENDS ENVOYS TO SPAIN

F or a time, there was the possibility of even more extensive
contacts between T okugawa Japan and the West. Ieyasu, the
first Tokugawa Shogun, deliberately sought to make Japan a
great center of international trade. China, mindful of Hideyoshi's Korean invasions, rebuffed him. He then turned to the
West-that is, to Spain, then the richest trading nation of
Europe. In 1610 Ieyasu concluded a commercial treaty with
the Spanish governor of the Philippines. In 1610 and 1614 J apanese envoys crossed the Pacific and visited some of the Spanish possessions in America. Then they \-vent on across the Atlantic. In Madrid the Japanese envoy had an audience with King
Philip ilIon January 30, 1615; later, he saw the Pope at Rome.
The Spanish king, however, influenced by the anti-Christian
persecutions that had already occurred in Japan, rej ected
Ieyasu's request for a treaty establishing trade relations with
Spain and the Spanish-American possessions.
BUT FINALLY PULLS IN HER LINES

It was not until more than two centuries later that such an
opportunity presented itself again. For soon after Ieyasu's death
in 1616, the policy of national seclusion was adopted.
Many factors led to this decision. The narrow intolerance
of the missionaries, as well as conflicts between rival Jesuit and
Franciscan orders, had created difficulties almost from the
beginning of their stay in Japan. More important was the fear
that estates of the Christian lords might become centers of
rebellion, and thus lay Japan open to conquest by a foreign
power. Persecution began under Hideyoshi, and after 1616 a
series of anti-Christian edicts was issued. The Christian persecutions reached their height in 1622-24, although Christianity
was not fully stamped out until 1638.
At this time Japanese were forbidden to go abroad, and the
building of large sea-going vessels was also prohibited. All for-
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eign traders and priests either left Japan or were expelled. A
small Dutch trading center, restricted after 1641 to the islet
patch of Deshima, was all that remained of the early period of
intercourse with the West. By 1650 the policy of national seclusion, introduced by the Shoguns of the Tokugawa clan, was in
full force. It was maintained until after the middle of the nineteenth century, or well into the modern era.
THE DUTCH OASIS ON DESHIMA

We should be on guard, however, against some common errors
about this important period in Japan's history. The tern1
"hermit nation" must not be taken too literally. Seclusion was
not complete. Through the Dutch settlement on Deshima, ideas
from Europe filtered into Japan. A small group of Japanese
scholars studied the Dutch language. In 1745 they prepared a
Dutch-Japanese dictionary, and in 1774 a Dutch textbook on
anatomy was translated. Of course, Japan did not keep abreast
of Western technical progress during the Tokugawa epoch.
But valuable beginnings were made, especially in language
study, medicine, geography, map-making and military science.
Another common error associated with the idea of a "hermit
nation" is that Tokugawa Japan remained static for two hundred years. In reality great internal changes occurred during
this period, some of which were fundamental. By 1850 Japan
was a very different country from what it had been in 1650.
The seeming lack of development was most evident in the
Tokugawa political system. Its broad outlines did not, in fact,
change very much. The Emperor and his court "\vere kept
secluded at Kyoto. The real center of government lay in
Tokyo, where the Shoguns and their ministers ruled. Most
of the land was owned by the Tokugawa family and the great
feudal lords (daimy 0) closely associated with it. About threeeighths, however, was owned by the "outer lords," such as
Choshu and Satsuma. These "outer lords" were viewed as

potential rebels, and were denied posts in the central administration. All of the feudal lords had to spend certain months in
attendance on the Shogun at Tokyo, and had to leave their
families there as hostages when they went back to their o\vn
lands.
FOUR CLASSES OF SOCIETY

Efforts were made to draw strict class lines. The feudal lords
and their military retainers, or samurai, held the highest rank.
The farmers came next, but they were severely taxed and
harshly treated. The townspeople were looked upon as the
lowest class of all. A samurai had the right to cut down a
merchant with his sword, but very early in the Tokugawa
period he learned to respect the power of the merchant's
purse.
Yet all measures to preserve a rigid centralized feudalism,
and to nlaintain Tokugawa rule, proved futile. Halfway
through the period serious economic problems began to appear. By 1850 the whole system was on the verge of collapse.
THE SHOGUNS FAIL TO CONTROL THE MERCHANTS

In their attempts to prevent change, the Shoguns were unable
to master one basic element in their society-trade and industry.
Even before the Tokugawa regime was established, as we have
seen, Japan's commerce had already grown sizable. Foreign
trade was then cut off. But internal trade, stimulated by a long
period of peace, continued to develop. New luxury goods of
many varieties were produced, and industry prospered. The
merchant class in the cities grew wealthy and powerful. Large
business houses, including the present Mitsui firm, were
founded. Money, instead of rice, became the medium of
exchange. The transition to a money economy was gradual,
but it worked a revolution in Japanese society.
Incomes of the daimy 0 and samurai were in rice. The rice had
30

JAPAN'S PRE-RESTORATION SOCIETY
DAIMYO
(A Feudal Lord)
Ruler but
heovily in
debt

SAMURAI

/I

(Militory

Retoiners)

. Poor but
proud

PEASANTS
Poor and
downtrodden

MERCHANt
Despised "but
wealthy

to be changed into money, and great exchange marts-similar
to our modern commodity exchanges-grew up in Osaka. The
rice brokers "rigged" prices. Dizzy price fluctuations occurred.
The feudal lords and their samurai fell into debt to the
rice brokers and the money lenders. Government intervention
did not help matters. The Shogunate either debased the coinage,
or tried vainly to control prices by decree. The farmers
suffered most of all-from the change to money, from the
price fluctuations, and from still heavier taxes when the feudal
lords became indebted to the merchants. Mter 1725 the number of farmers declined; after 1750 peasant uprIsIngs were
frequent.

AND FACE A RISING REVOLT

In other ways, too, loyalty to the Shogunate was undermined. ,
The luxury of the towns stimulated a type of life quite the
opposite from that inspired by the Spartan ethical code, called
Bushido, of the samurai. Rich townspeople craved amusement
-and painting, the drama, and the novel flourished. No laws
could prevent the samurai from being drawn to this life, nor
could executing a more than usually lavish merchant or
usurer turn back the tide of the new age.
Other intellectual currents were more acutely dangerous
to the Shogunate. Ancient history, literature and religion were
studied, and there was a revival of interest in Shintoism. From
these historical and literary schools there grew a political movement, aimed at restoring the Emperor to his former place as
ruler of the nation.
Thus, by the middle of the nineteenth century, the country
was ripe for revolt. In the background lay the misery and distress of the farmer. But the active promoters of this revolutionary overthrow of the 'Shogunate were discontented groups
within the ruling class. Four of these groups banded together
to bring about the Restoration: (I) the "outer lords" of Choshu, Satsuma and the other western fiefs; ( 2 ) the lesser
samurai, ambitious and energetic; (3) the merchants, who
desired removal of feudal restrictions on their business activities; and (4) the court nobles of ancient lineage who still
clung to the Emperor at Kyoto. This was a powerful coalition, and sooner or later it would undoubtedly have brought
down the Shogunate through its own strength. As it happened,
pressure on Japan from Western nations came to its aid and
hastened the outbreak of the revolt that was brewing inside
the country.
I
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v.

How the Door Was Opened

By the nineteenth century, a new flood of Western influence
was sweeping into the Far East. As in the age of exploration and discovery, the West was knocking at the door.
In those earlier days, we must remember, the West had had
little to offer in the way of progress. In fact, in the arts and
in the graces of civilized life, the East could have given
pointers to the West. But now the West came strong in the
might of the industrial revolution. Master of machine technique, it was turning out manufactured products in larg~r and
larger quantities. It was extending international trade by leaps
and bounds. It was seeking new markets and sources of raw
materials throughout the world. And the most powerful of the
Western countries were staking out colonies wherever they
could.
A PERIOD OF TRANSITION

1853 to 1868 were the years of transition for Japan. They

were crowded with events that laid the cornerstone of the
modern Japanese Empire.
Two broad trends were uppermost during these years. First,
there was the coming of the Western powers with their demand for diplomatic relations, trade and intercourse-in a word,
for the end of the seclusion policy and the opening of japan's
door. Of course, the Shogun, as the ruling power, had the
job of dealing with the Western nations. Too weak to resist,
he had to give way. And his enemies at home seized on this
opportunity to discredit him. The second main trend, therefore, was the sharpening of Japan's internal conflict.
The extraordinary thing about this internal conflict in Japan
was this. The groups opposing the Shogunate were revolutionaries: they rejected the existing system and fought for a
, new one. They sought progress for Japan-and progress meant
opening the country to Western influence. Yet in their struggle
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with the Shoguns they were all against the foreigner. The
reason is not far to seek. Anti-foreign demonstrations provided
a handy weapon for attacking and discrediting the Shogunate.
As we shall see later on, when it had served its purpose, this
weapon was dropped.
But, meanwhile, let us look a little mor~ closely at the two
broad trends we have mentioned. Let us see first how, by a
series of steps taken between 1853 and 1867, Japan's door was
gradually opened.
THE "UNEQUAL" TREATIES

What happened to Japan in her relations with the Western
powers at this time had previously happened to China. For
a long time there had been a closely regulated Western trade
at Canton. During the early nineteenth century this trade had
steadily expanded. China's last-minute efforts to keep real control in her own hands were unsuccessful. The Anglo-Chinese
war of 1839-42, and further conflicts in 1857-60, ended China's
seclusion and forced the lVlanchu authorities to treat with the
Western powers on terms of diplomatic equality. The treaties
signed at this time-later called the "unequal" treaties-actually
established China's inequality. Not oilly were new ports
opened to Western trade. But a fixed schedule of Chinese tariff
dues, usually not exceeding 5 per cent, was also enforced. In
addition, Western nationals were exempted from trial under
Chinese law. Instead, they were to be tried in courts set up
by their own consuls in China. This was the system known
as "extraterritoriality."
These events in China did not pass unnoticed in Japan.
Many of the Japanese leaders, despite the Shogunate's policy
of isolation, were aware of what was happening in China.
They began to be alarmed over Japan's future, fearing that the
Western powers would soon be knocking at Japan's door.
And sure enough, very soon they were.
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COMMODORE PERRY BRINGS A LETTER

The visits of Commodore Perry's squadron to Japan in 1853
and 1854, bearing President Fillmore's letter asking for the
opening of trade relations, were the prelude. Commodore
Perry secured the first treaty, on March 31, 1854. More important was the commercial treaty (July 29, 1858) negotiated
by Townsend Harris, first American Minister to Japan. This
treaty opened five Japanese ports to Americans for trade
and residence, and-like the treaties with China-provided for
a fixed tariff schedule and extraterritoriality. It was the model
for similar agreements, also concluded in 1858, with England,
France, Russia and Holland. All of these treaties were signed
by the Shogun, but not by the Emperor. Later, as the Emperor's power grew, the opposition sought to prevent application of the treaties on the ground that the Emperor had not
ratified them. In November 1865, however, an Allied naval
demonstration off Osaka forced the Emperor to give his
signature. Finally, in June 1866, a tariff convention set 5 per
cent as the duty on practically all imports and exports.
We shall have to return to these treaties a little later.
For soon after the Restoration of the Emperor, they became
a galling yoke to the Japanese. The tariff and extraterritorial
provisions, in particular, were resented as shackles on the full
exercise of Japan's sovereignty. Three long decades were to
pass before Japan gained enough strength, toward the close
of the century, to revise these unequal treaties.
THE INTERNAL STRUGGLE IN JAPAN

At the time the treaties were negotiated, however, the issue was
not one of equality. The issue was whether there should be
any treaties at all. For many Japanese wanted no opening of
japan's door. After the first treaties, nevertheless, a growing
number of Westemers began to live in the ports opened to
foreigners. The cry to "expel the foreigner" was then raised,
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Coupled with this slogan was the challenging demand to
"revere the Emperor"-a direct call to revolution against the
Shogun. The whole country was aroused. It seethed with
internal strife and dissension, with plots and counter-plots,
and even with armed conflict.
The anti-foreign movement was merely the spark that
set off a bonfire that had been long in the making. By 1850
the Shogunate was nearly bankrupt. The feudal lords, or
daimyo, were in the same position. Most/of their landed property was mortgaged to the merchant-bankers-the rising
capitalist class. Thousands of samurai were poverty-stricken.
The condition of the peasantry, taxed more and more heavily
to pay for the debts of the feudal lords, was desperate. Even
the wealthy merchants, irked by feudal restrictions and the
social and political inferiority that was forced upon them, were
dissatisfied. The demand for change was growing broader and
deeper.
SUPPORTERS OF THE EMPEROR

In Kyoto the Emperor had become the center of an active
and determined political movement. Its platform-anti-foreign
and anti-Tokugawa-called for the restoration of the Imperial
power. The court nobles and a growing number of the samurai
and feudal lords supported it. Wealthy merchant-banker families, such as the Mitsui house, provided it with cash. Above
all, the movement was eventually backed by a coalition of the
western clans, notably those of Choshu and Satsuma. The part
these clans played, both in the Restoration movement and in
the later Imperial government, was decisive.
THE ROLE OF THE WESTERN CLANS

These clans, you will remember, were ruled by so-called "outer
lords," who were denied a part in the Tokugawa administration. The fact that they were so far from the center of government at Tokyo encouraged the1!1 to be independent. More-
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WESTERN CLANS
(Mid-19th Centu ry)
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nt feudal lords are

over, they were in many respects the strongest and most
progressive of the leading Japanese clans. In developing manufacture and trade as a means of boosting clan revenue, Satsuma,
Choshu, Tosa and Hizen were far ahead of other clans; They
fostered not only handicrafts, porcelain manufacture, sugarrefining and textile mills, but mining, iron foundries, gunmaking, shipbuilding and allied military industries. Choshu
also made a revolutionary change in its army, by including
commoners as well as the samurai in its ranks.
In these western clans, the anti-foreign' spirit was at first
intense. F or some years, in defiance of the Shogunate, the
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clans carried on what was practically an 'independent war
against the Western powers and the new treaty rights of
Westerners in Japan. They frequently attacked foreigners
. and ·their employees. Things came to a head in 1863-64, when
they tried to expel the foreigners. In August 1863, in retaliation for the murder of an Englishman by Satsuma clansmen, a
British squadron bombarded the Satsuma port of Kagoshima.
And in September 1864 an Allied fleet (British, Dutch, French,
American) destroyed Choshu forts at Shimonoseki which had
been firing on Western vessels passing through the narrow
straits.
These decisive proofs of Western military and naval superiority gave Satsuma and Choshu pause. Both clans stopped their
anti-foreign activities. They had long seen the need of acquiring modern armaments. This determination was now made
doubly strong. Many other leaders came to see that Japan could
not keep her door shut forever, and that her salvation lay in
mastering Western techniques. Once having grasped this principle, they acted on it boldly and unhesitatingly.
THE RESTORATION

The Emperor's prestige-and, indeed, actual authority-had
grown steadily throughout this transition period. As early as
1858, recognizing the Emperor's new importance, the Shogun
sought his approval of greater intercourse with the West. In
1863 the Shogun even obeyed an Imperial summons to Kyoto.
The advent of a new Shogun and a new Emperor in 1867
made the transfer of authority all the easier. In November 1867
the new Shogun resigned, and on January 3, 1868 the Emperor
Meiji, backed by the western clans, formally assumed control
of the nation. Six months later the Tokugawa forces, taking the
field in opposition to the seizure of power by the western
clans, were defeated in pitched battle. A .new Empire had
been founded.

VI.

Catching up with the West

Great difficulties faced the early Meiji reformers. Their essential task was to catch up with the West. For two centuries
Japan had kept to herself. During this period the Western
world had made gigantic technical advances, greater than man
had achieved in all preceding history. Japan had been left
far behind. She was forced to do in decades what the West
had done in centuries.
How could Japan accomplish such a task? In both economy
and government she was still largely feudal and decentralized.
There was no real national state, as we understand that term
today. Instead, there were a hundred competing clans, each
with its own territorial lord. And over all lay the shadow of
Western aggression, dictating speed and more speed.
TACKLING THE PROBLEM

From ~he outset of the Meiji .era, anti-foreignism was dropped.
Emperor Meiji's famous Charter Oath (April 6, 1868) contained this statement: "Knowledge and learning shall be sought
for throughout the world in order to establish the foundations of the Empire."
A period of borrowing from the West, comparable only to
the earlier imitation of China, set in. One after another, Japanese official missions were sent abroad. Foreign advisersBritish, French, Dutch, German, American-were employed in
many different fields. Large numbers of Japanese students
entered the universities of Western countries. F or a short
time imitation of the West went to extremes; in many externals,
Western ways became a fad. On the whole, however, there
was strict control over the process of borrowing, and careful
adaptation to Japanese needs.
In keeping with Japan's traditions, a limited group maintained firm and despotic power at all times. The Meiji political
reforms clothed old ideas of government in new garments.
39

Emperor Meiji (1868-1912) reigned again, and with some
degree of authority. But actual power during his long reign
lay in the hands of the small group of men who surrounded
him. There was no thoroughgoing mass upheaval, forcing
recognition of popular rights. Reforms were dictated from the
top down.
THREE NEW TRENDS

The great changes which occurred during the Meiji era may
be grouped under three main headings. There were, in the first
place, the economic reforms which merged the old feudal
lords and samurai into a new society, and laid the foundations
of Japan's modern industries. Then, there was a political movement which led finally to the Emperor's proclamation of a written constitution. Finally, there was a cautious development of
foreign policy by which Japan, at first on the defensive, later
embarked on an expansionist program and fought its wars
with China and Russia. In this chapter we shall look at the
first of these trends.
ABOLITION OF FEUDAL RIGHTS

Between 1868 and 1877 a series of basic reforms gave centralized control to the Imperial government. Th~ four western clans returned their lands to the Emperor, thus enabling
him to order the other clans to do the same. In this way the
government took over the land taxes, the main source of
revenue. But the lords, though they no longer held the land
registers, were still political rulers in their feudal domains.
So, in 1871, an Imperial decree established prefectures, with
Imperial governors, in place of the old clan divisions. Finally,
the feudal lords lost their private armies. At first, the Imperial
government's army consisted mainly of the military forces of
the western clan.s. By 1873, however, the government was able
to enforce a system of universal military service, and thus build
up a national conscript army under its own absolute control.
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Why, you ask, did the feudal lords accept so easily this
rapid loss of their former powers? In large part, it was a result
{)f the lead taken by the western clans, whose samurai statesmen
held the reins in the Imperial governmept. For they were prepared to back the new measures with military action, if necessary. But a second factor was equally important. The clan lords,
especially the great daimyo, were well paid for the surrender
of their old privileges. Their lands were not confiscated outright. Large annual grants of money were allotted them out
of central revenues. But the payments originally promised in
this huge pension scheme turned out to be too heavy for the
central treasury to meet. The government therefore first reduced the pensions and then, in 1876, compulsorily ended them
by means of lump-sum payments, in cash or short-term bonds.
Though this drastic scaling down of the original pension
scheme amounted to repudiating its earlier promises, the government had no other way of avoiding bankruptcy. As it was,
the total cost of commuting the pensions came to nearly 2 I I
million yen-a large sum for that period. In many respects, this
way of dealing with the pensions laid the basis of the new
Japanese society which has since developed.
LORDS INTO CAPITALISTS

The daimyo, or great feudal lords, did not fare so badly in the
financial settlement of 1876. They were relieved of all their
debts, and of their previous obligations to support their military retainers, the samurai. They retained great slices of their
former lands, which they now held as private owners-that is,
with fewer responsibilities. Moreover, they acquired large sums
of money when the pensions were commuted. These sums
they invested in banks, stocks and industries, as well as in
landed estates. The daimyo were thus merged into the new
society, no longer as territorial rulers but as wealthy financial
magnates, controlling the economic life of the countryside.

So, from their own point of view, commutation of the pensions was a master-stroke by Japan's new rulers. It helped to
throw caste distinctions of the old feudal type into the melting
pot. It won the allegiance of the clan lords to the new order
simply by making allegiance worth their while.
THE LOT OF THE SAMURAI

But in other respects this bold reform created a number of
serious difficulties. The samurai class as a whole was plunged
into great distress. A few of them, especially those from the
western clans, immediately won high positions in the new government. But most of them were left to sink or swim in a
strange new world. Their small pension payments soon dribbled away, and it was hard for them to find means of support. They had other grievances. A law of 1877 forbade them
to wear their two swords-traditional mark of honor of the
santurai class. 1877, too, was the year when the samurai were
replaced by the new conscript army. During this critical year
a serious military revolt, centering in Satsuma but joined by all
the forces opposed to the new order, broke out. It was crushed
by the Imperial government's new army, made up largely of
commoners and partly modernized. Thus the last challenge
to the new order was defeated.
HARD TIMES FOR THE PEASANTS

The peasants had an even harder time than the samurai.
Many local peasant revolts took place in the years up to
1877. Imperial forces suppressed them, and so prevented the
peasants from indulging in mass confiscations of lands.
Yet great changes were taking place. For the peasants were
no longer feudal serfs. They became landholders, and they
could serve in the army. But the individual peasant secured
only a very small plot of land. As a private owner, his situation was most precarious. He had to face the risks of drought
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or flood, pay taxes in money instead of rice, and cope with
price changes in the market. His land soon had to be mortgaged,
and could then be taken away by foreclosure. Indeed, many
peasants quickly lost their lands in the early years of the new
order. By 1892 nearly 40 per cent of the total cultivated area
was worked by tenants. This proportion has persisted, while the
number of part-tenants has increased.
Japanese agriculture, moreover, remained backward in technique and social organization. The landlords became parasites.
Instead of working the land as a capitalist enterprise for profit,
they were intent only on drawing high rents-often as much as
60 per cent. This system had far-reaching effects on Japan.
As the number of tenants grew, and the land became divided
into smaller and smaller plots, the farm areas in Japan became
overpopulated. Only a part of the unneeded farm workers
could find a place in industry. Competing for jobs, they kept
wages low. Low wages, of course, were a boon to industrial
development. But what industry gained in one way it lost in
another. For the farmers and the workers were too poor to
buy much. The country's purchasing power grew only very
slowly. Thus the home market for factory products was limited, and industry did not develop as fast as it might otherwise
have done. Very early Japan's new factory industries had
to turn to the foreign market. As the limitations on Japan's
home market have persisted down to the present time, the
pressure for foreign trade expansion has grown steadily more
urgent. Here is one underlying cause for Japan's current policy
of military expansion.
INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT

But changes in agriculture, as we have seen, did help to make
possible the growth of a modern Japanese industry. Peasants
who lost their lands, or artisans thrown out of work, became
available as factory workers. Here was industry's labor force.
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Many other changes helped industry along. Foreign trade,
long prohibited, had begun to grow rapidly in the 'sixties. Clan
barriers to internal trade were leveled. ,Hundreds of different
kinds of money, issued by the various clans, had circulated.
These were now abolished, and a single national currency
instituted. Railways were built, and telephone and telegraph
systems laid down. These improvements made a freer sale and
exchange of goods throughout the country possible. Thus a
home market-even if a very limited one-was established.
, For the introduction of modern, large-scale industry, however, two further things were needed-technique and capital.
Foreign experts, acting both as direct advisers in industry and
as instructors in the new technical schools, provided the first
of these requireme,nts. The second was harder to fill. The banking-trader houses and the pensioned-off lords had some capital.
But it was not enough to finance the big factory projects,
especially where quick profits seemed unlikely. So the Imperial
government had to step in and supply the capital in most of
the larger enterprises. It paid special attention to the armament industries-mining, metallurgy, shipbuilding.
NURSING INFANT INDUSTRIES

The clan bureaucrats in the government nursed the construction of this new industrial plant with extreme care and pride.
Many of them fell in love with machinery and engineering
technique. They worked closely with the great business houses,
grafting industry on to firms that had been mainly concerned
with trade or banking. The budding capitalists were not financially strong enough to develop industry by themselves. So
the clan statesmen took them into partnership. It was the clan
statesmen, however, who headed the combination-an important factor in Japan's political gr~wth, then and later.
But the clansmen did not wish to keep all industry under
govemment control. They only wanted to see that it developed
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quickly. Then the businessmen could handle it, or at least
all but the strategic industries. The government kept control
of railways, telephones, telegraphs, arsenals and naval shipyards. But in the case of many other industries, it supplied
the capital and started their development, then turned them
back to the great business houses, often at very low prices.
In this way the capitalists were spoon-fed by the government.
l\1itsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo and other houses obtained readymade facilities in many fields-cotton-spinning mills, glass and
cement factories, mining enterprises, shipyards. The giant Mitsubishi monopoly in commercial shipping, for example, got its
start through the gift and cheap purchase of government
vessels.
By 1890 some 200 steam factories were in operation in
Japan. The development of a machine industry was making
good headway.
I

VII.

Who Rules Modern Japan?

Weare now able to distinguish the main groups which were to
rule the modern Japanese Empire. Within the quarter century
from 1853 to 1877 a new leadership had emerged.
True to japan's history and tr~dition, control was concentrated in a few hands. The ruling group was composed of the
clan leaders, dominating the government bureaucracy (since
grown to nearly 500,000 office holders); the old feudal lords
with great landed estates; and the business group-bankers,
traders and industrialists.
HAND IN GLOVE

At the head of this partnership were the clan leaders, and a
few representatives of the old court nobility. The clan bureaucrats, as they came to be called, held the influential posts in
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the new Imperial government. To a large extent, their dictatorial powers carried on the old feudal tradition. Many of
them were civilians, but they also controlled the army (Choshu)
and the navy (Satsuma). The business people, on the other
hand, especially in the beginning, were definitely in a subordinate position. It was the government which controlled
most of the early industrial enterprises, as we have seen. Not
until much later, after the World War of 1914-18, did trade
and industry reach a size which enabled the capitalists to
make themselves felt politically.
It was the existence of the "upper crust" and the inferior
status of business that largely determined the charac!er of
the new political institutions established during the Meiji era.
They were designed, it is true, to serve the purposes of the
whole combination of ruling groups. But at the same time
the clan bureaucrats took good care to set up the machinery
they needed to perpetuate their own supremacy.
CONSERVATIVES VS. LIBERALS

For a decade after the Restoration of 1868, an outright dictatorship functioned in Japan. The powers of the clansmen
were almost unlimited. Within the ruling group itself, however,
there were wide differences of opinion on some points. One
important question was what institutional forms the new government should adopt. Headed by Itagaki (a T osa samurai), the
more liberal reformers wanted to set up a fully representative
government modeled on the advanced Western democracies.
But most of the clansmen opposed such a radical step. In the
end, however, the conservatives accepted the necessity of a
written constitution-which they drew up themselves.
Even this concession was made grudgingly, and only after
it had become absolutely necessary. But several factors worked
in favor of the liberals. The ,prestige of Western institutions
was high at this period. An article in the Emperor's Charter
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Oath, moreover, was interpreted as a pledge to inaugurate a
"deliberative assembly." Quoting this pledge, the liberals
started a political campaign which won considerable support.
Finally, the rising capitalists needed a representative system in
order to secure a real voice in the government. Despite all
these advantages, in the end the liberals were outmaneuvered
in the political arena. They obtained a constitution, it is true,
but one which was written and imposed by the conservative clansmen. The result was not a democratic Bill of Rights
but a highly autocratic document. With but few exceptions, the
liberals' failure ' at this time was characteristic of Japan's later
history.
THE LIBERALS LOSE

The political struggle reached its climax in the second decade
after the Restoration. In the press and on the public platform,
the liberals waged their campaign. In 1878 they succeeded in
getting provincial assemblies with limited powers, and in
1880 local (town, city and village) assemblies. In 188 I, riots
followed the exposure of graft in the central administration.
To save their position, the conservatives had the Emperor issue
a declaration promising a National Assembly in 189o-nine
years ahead.
But the political struggle did not abate. It now turned on
what should be the terms of the constitution which was to
establish the elective assembly. The conservatives meanwhile
took strong measures against the opposition. They strictly
enforced laws curbing the press. They suppressed Itagaki's
political party in 1884. In 1887 martial law was proclaimed in
Tokyo, and the opposition leaders were driven from the capital.
In this way the conservative bureaucrats got a free hand in
drafting the new constitution and putting it over.
Hirobumi Ito, its main architect, had gone abroad in 1882 to
study Western constitutional practices. He was greatly Im47

pressed by Bismarck, and took the Prussian Constitution as his
model. First, certain preparatory changes were made. A
nobility of five orders was established in 1884, and a Cabinet
in 1885. A civil service was started, and in 1887 a Supreme
War Council was set up to advise the Emperor on military
and naval affairs. In 1888 Ito became president of the Privy
Council, which was given authority to revise the draft constitution he had prepared. Ito's work of framing the document
was carried out "in absolute ' secrecy." After it had been read
in private to a small group of officials, the Emperor promulgated the new constitution on February I I, 1889. The first elections to the Imperial Diet were held in 1890.
A GIFT OF THE EMPEROR

The Constitution was a "gift" of the Emperor. It was not
intended to' establish popular government. Its preamble emphasized the old theocratic (priest-king) traditions of Japan.
The Emperor "inherited" the right to rule "from Our Ancestors," and ruled "in lineal succession unbroken for ages eternal."
Ito and his colleagues not only incorporated these traditional
ideas into the Constitution. They made them the cornerstone
of the new system of universal education, and thus instilled
them in the mass of the Japanese people. Reverence for the
Emperor as a divine ruler helped enormously to keep the new
regime solidly in place.
Practically all the government's powers, both civil and military, were vested in the Emperor. \Tast economic power
bolstered his political authority. No longer, as on occasion in
feudal times, could the Emperor become penniless. For court
expenses, the Imperial Family receives an annual grant of
4,500,000 yen (more than a million dollars). Its holdings in
lands and blocks of shares, estimated at over one billion yen,
provide a large additional income. So it is one of the wealthiest
families in Japan.
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JAPAN'S RULING SYSTEM
THE GOVERNMENT UNDER ITO'S CONSTITUTION
PRIVY COUNCIL

'"t"
THE EMPEROR MUST BE "CONSTITUTIONAL"

The Emperor's powers are exercised on the advice of his
ministers, in accordance with constitutional practic~. He is not
supposed to act on his o"vn authority. Real power, therefore,
resides not in the Emperor but in his advisers, acting through
the agencies set up by the Constitution. On the surface, these
agencies seem to establish a systenl of representative government. There is a Cabinet, and a Diet with two houses-the
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House of Peers and the House of Representatives. And political
parties like those of the Western democracies soon formed to
contest elections in Japan.
But there the resemblance ends. There is not only the supposedly divine power of the Emperor. The democratic forms
themselves are a shell, empty of the real meat of popular
government. In all effective representative systems, as· we well
know, the legislature-particularly its lower house-has real
authority. Not so under Ito's Constitution. Ito ranged an overwhelming battery of aristocratic, bureaucratic and militarist
influence in five powerful agencies of government. You can see
from our chart on page 49 what these agencies were. They
completely eclipsed the House of Representatives. Moreover,
they often dominated the Cabinet, or disputed its authority.
And through them, as much as through the Cabinet, the clansmen ruled Japan with a tight rein. Let us see how each worked
out in practice.
NON-POPULAR AGENCIES OF GOVERNMENT

First, there were the Elder Statesmen (or Genro). They were a
body completely outside the Constitution. Survivors of the
early Meiji clansmen, they had prestige and experience. For
several decades after 1900 they held the government in the hollow of their hands. They made and unmade Cabinets, shuffied
the Premiership among themselves, decided on war and peace.
Their last representative, Prince Saionji, died in November
1940 at the age of 92. ·So from now on there will be no more
Genro to be reckoned with.
Next comes the Imperial Household Ministry. Two officials
here occupy key positions. The Lord Keeper of the Privy
Seal holds the seals which must be affixed to state documents.
And the Minister of the Imperial Household has charge of
matters connected with the Imperial Family. These men are
not only themselves powerful advisers of the Emperor. But
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appointments to see the Emperor must be made through them.
So at times they have been able to bar their political opponents
from reaching the Imperial ear. Usually they hold office for ·
life or until they wish to resign.
The Privy Council is likewise a useful piece of machinery
for Japan's ruling group. It is the supreme advisory body to
the Emperor. It consists of 26 life members, usually of great
age. Cabinet Ministers serve as members of the Council exofficio, but are outvoted by at least two to one. Among other
things, the Privy Council ratifies treaties, approves amendments
to the Constitution, and passes on Imperial ordinances.
The House of Peers consists of about 400 members, of whom
more than 200 are drawn from the nobility, 125 are life appointees, and nearly 70 are elected from the largest taxpayers.
It is an extremely aristocratic and conservative body. Yet its
powers equal those of the lower house. And its members can
become Premiers or Cabinet Ministers.
Lastly, the Army and Navy, with their General Staffs and
their representatives on the Supreme War Council, are largely
independent of civilian control. The chiefs of the General
Staffs and the War and Navy Ministers have direct access to
the Emperor. This means that they can go over the Premier's
head to appeal any decision of his to the Emperor. The War
and Navy Ministers cannot be civilians. They must be ranking
officers in active service. Since they are nominated by the
Supreme War Council, the latter body can overthrow a Cabinet
by simply ordering them to resign. Or it can prevent the formation of a new Cabinet which it does not like by refusing to
offer nominations for the War and Navy Ministries.
THE PEOPLE'S REPRESENTATIVES

As against these aristocratic, bureaucratic and military organs
of government, the popular will can be expressed only through
the House of Representatives. The position of the House is
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-v ery weak, especially in comparison with the normal legislature of a full-fledged democracy.
For Ito saw fit to curb the powers of the Diet's lower house
by a series of drastic restrictions. Large fixed, or non-votable,
expenditures limit its control over the public purse. If appropriations are not voted, the Cabinet has the right to enforce
the preceding year's budget. Most bills are introduced not by
Diet members but by the Cabinet, which also possesses an
absolute veto. Moreover, the Cabinet can issue Imperial ordinances which, with few qualifications, have the .force of law.
It can dissolve the lower house, and thus force an electionan expensive proceeding for the deputies. And for several
decades only part of the people could vote. Not until 1925 was
full manhood suffrage (age 25) adopted. During elections the
Home Ministry has often intimidated the voters. And popular
rights are further curbed by a controlled press, a strong centralized police force, a large degree of central domination of
local government, and the possibility that one may be arrested
and held indefinitely without trial (because Japan has no habeas
corpus law).
The development of a Cabinet with independent power,
responsible to the lower house of the Diet, would seem impossible under these circumstances. Entrenched positions were
held by the aristocrats, the bureaucrats and the militarists.
F or if they did not control the Cabinet, always a necessary
citadel of power, they could be sure of bringing about its
downfall. A responsible Cabinet did emerge in the post-war
years. But, as we shall see, this period was short-lived. After
1930, largely through the pressure , of the militarists, the
pendulum swung back.

VIII.

Creating a Modern Empire

By 1890, when the first Diet elections were held, the foundations of a new Empire had been laid. In the few short years
·since 1868, the old feudal society had undergone a profound
change. Agriculture was still the key to Japan's economy,
but factory industry and foreign trade were growing in importance. A strong centralized state had come into being.
Modern methods were revolutionizing science, education,
medicine, law and many other fields. There was an army recruited through universal service and trained in Western ways,
and the beginnings of a modern navy.
JAPAN LOOKS ABROAD

The Meiji statesmen were now ready to turn their attention'
to foreign policy. Even before the Restoration many of the
Japanese leaders had favored territorial expansion. During the
years of internal reform, however, they had cautiously refrained from rash adventures abroad. A strong movement in
favor of a punitive expedition to Korea had developed in 187173, but the dominant clan bureaucrats had skilfully prevented
the outbreak of war. They had permitted a Formosan expedition in 1874, but had settled the resulting issues peacefully
"\vith China. Some small gains had been made. The Bonin
Islands were annexed in 1876, and the Liuchiu Islands in 1879.
A naval demonstration in 1876 secured to Japan special treaty
rights in Korea, which led to more and more intervention in
Korean affairs.
But these were not the foreign problems which chiefly
occupied the early Meiji leaders. First and foremost, they were
trying to change the unequal treaties concluded with the
Western powers at the end of the Tokl1gawa period. These
treaties, you will remember, permitted Western nationals to
be tried in their own consular courts (the system of extraterri-
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toriality), and fixed Japan's tariff at the low rate of 5 per cent.
The struggle to throw off these irksome restrictions was the
central issue in Japan's foreign relations down to 1894.
FIGHTING THE UNEQUAL TREATIES

The Japanese made many efforts to regain control of both
tariffs and courts before they finally won success. An official
mission under Prince I"vakura toured Western capitals in 187173 but failed to gain treaty revision. As other attempts also came
to nothing, an intense popular resentment developed in Japan.
In 1889, just when his negotiations for treaty revision were
progressing favorably, a bomb tore off Count Okuma's leg.
Success was not won, however, until a new treaty was concluded with Great Britain on July 16, 1894. The other powers
soon followed suit. Japan's law courts had been modernized,
and she now enforced new civil, commercial and criminal
codes. In 1899, when the new treaties went into effect, all
Westerners became subject to Japanese law. These treaties
thus brought the extraterritorial system to an end. But they
all contained tariff schedules that lasted for 12 years, so that
Japan did not secure full control over her own tariffs until
the treaties expired in 191 I.
WAR WITH CHINA

On July 25, 1894, nine days after signature of the "equal"
treaty with Great Britain, Japanese naval forces suddenly
attacked and sank a transport carrying Chinese troops to
Korea. War was formally declared on August I. Thus, by an
unusual coincidence, Japan was at war with China two weeks
after she had won her twenty-five-year campaign for treaty
reVISIon.
Japan's statesmen had correctly estimated the weakness of
China, as well as their own degree of preparedness. They did
not plunge into war on a hasty impulse. The army and navy
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were tuned for action. With harsh realism, the Japanese leaders
unhesitatingly adopted a program of expansion by force as
soon as conditions seemed favorable. Their fight for treaty
revision had been a fight for equality with the Western powers.
They believed that even fuller recognition of equality would
come after a successful war. They were also driven by strong
economic considerations. The restrictions of the narrow home
market were already irking Japan's youthful cotton textile
export houses, and they were trying to pry their way into the
Korean and Chinese markets. Victory in the Sino-Japanese
War of 1894-95 opened both these markets to Japanese manufacturers. It was a significant omen of the future that the new
Japan should have discovered, so early in its career, that resort
to the s"\vord might help to overcome the handicaps of its late
appearance on the international scene.
We should also take note of several other results of Japan's
first nlodern war. The territorial gains-Formosa and the Pescadores Islands-were a welcome prize. More important was
China's formal recognition of Korean independence, which left
Japan practically a free hand in the peninsula. By its new
commercial treaty with China, Japan also gained the benefits
of extraterritoriality and low tariff rates in that country-the
system she hated so heartily when it was applied against herself, as it still was at that time. The war indemnity of nearly
$180,000,000, moreover, helped Japan to expand its armaments
still further in preparation for the war with Russia in 19°4.
THUS FAR AND NO FARTHER

An episode which heightened Japan's senSItIveness in her
foreign relations marked the peace settlement. In the Treaty
of Shimonoseki, China had agreed to cede Japan the Liaotung
Peninsula in South Manchuria. Germany, Russia and France
objected to this territorial cession, and backed their objections
by an ultimatum to Tokyo threatening war. Japan was forced
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to submit, and in exchange for a slight increase in the indemnity, the territory was returned to China. More than the preRestoration bombardments of Kagoshima and Shimonoseki,
more even than the galling yoke of the unequal treaties, this
"tripartite intervention" rankled in Japanese hearts. This sense
of humiliation was not lessened in 1898, when Russia secured
from China a 25-year lease of the southern tip of the disputed
Liaotung Peninsula and proceeded to fortify Port Arthur and
join Harbin to Dairen by a new railway line.
WAR WITH RUSSIA

On the whole, however, the gains of the war had proved sufficient to justify the calculations of Japan's leaders, and to
strengthen the forces within Japan that were working toward
expansion. In 1900 Japan took part as an equal with the Western powers in quelling the famous Boxer Uprising in China,
and shared in the returns from the Boxer Indemnity which they
later imposed as a punishment on the Chinese. The fact that
the British thought it worth while to sign an alliance with
Japan in 1902 was an additional testimony to her growing
prestige. Fortified by this alliance, and by strenuous efforts
to build up her military and naval forces, Japan emerged successfully from her clash with Tsarist Russia in 1904-05.
The peace terms did not include the indemnity Japan coveted, largely because she was too exhausted to continue the
struggle. But still there were substantial gains. Japan won a protectorate over Korea, which she converted to full annexation in
1910. The Russian leasehold at the tip of the Liaotung Peninsula
was transferred to Japan, and also the Russian railway lines in
South Manchuria. Finally, Russia ceded the southern half of
Sakhalin Island to Japan, and granted important fishing rights
in northern Pacific waters to Japanese interests.
The Treaty of Portsmouth, which set forth these terms and
in which President Theodore Roosevelt mediated, established
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Japan as the rising power in the Far East. In 1905, three weeks
before the treaty was signed, the Anglo-Japanese Alliance was
extended for ten years, with provisions sanctioning Japan's
paramount interests in Korea.
END OF THE MEIJI ERA

In the decade spanned by the two wars, Japan had forged
rapidly ahead in her economic development. Her foreign trade,
which totaled only 265 million yen in 1895, had jumped to 810
million in 1905 (see chart, page 61). Her steam shipping had
shown an even more extraordinary spurt-from 15,000 tons in
1893 to 1,552,000 tons in 1905.
On the political side, the new constitution worked out pretty
much as the clan statesmen had expected. For a short time the
bureaucrats had some difficulty with the Diet, where a liberal
opposition threatened to develop. But they soon checked this
tendency. They intimidated or bought off opposition leaders.
They embarked on a policy of war and expansion-which the
liberals supported. And, eventually, they organized parties
headed by members of the bureaucracy itself-in the :first
instance, Prince Ito.
The Meiji Emperor died on July 30, 1912. During his long
reign of nearly 45 years, all the great changes which we have
been considering had taken place. From a weak feudal state,
Japan had been transformed into a great power. Two years
after Emperor Meiji's passing, the outbreak of the World War
ushered in a period of still more ambitious expansion and
growth.

IX.

Japan and the First World War

The World War gave Japan her great opportunity, which her
leaders were quick to seize. The conditions created by W orId
War No. 1 might have been made to order for Japan. They
brought all her strategic advantages into play, and were ideally
adapted to meet her economic necessities.
Japan was not compelled to fight a full-dress war. The
Western powers were more than occupied on the European
battlefields, so Japan was given pretty much of a free hand
in the Far East. And the line-up of powers in 1914-18 added
greatly to the strategic advantage of her geographic location.
Britain and Russia were Japan's allies from the outset, while the
United States could not offer firm opposition to Japanese expansion. Thus Japan was able to achieve a great deal with
very little effort.
Conditions on the economic side were no less favorable.
As Japan's military and naval operations during the war were
relatively slight, the costs were small. On the other hand, her
economic gains were exceedingly large. For next to the United
States, Japan was the greatest supplier of the warring nations.
MAKING HAY WHILE THE SUN SHINES

It was the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, renewed for the third
time in 191 I, which gave Japan formal diplomatic cause for
entering the war. On August 23, 1914 she declared war on
Germany.
Mter a brief struggle, the German forces at the leasehold
of Tsingtao, in Shantung province, surrendered on November
7. A month later the whole of Shantung province was in
Japanese hands. Then followed the famous Twenty-One Demands on China. On May 25, 1915, at the point of a gun,
China signed treaties and notes incorporating many of these
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Twenty-One Demands. Among other things these treaties
confirmed japan's newly won position in Shantung province,
and extended her rail"vay and territorial rights in South Manchuria to the end of the century. American protests helped
to block the most sweeping demands, which would have made
China a Japanese protectorate. l\1eanwhile the Japanese navy
had scoured the Pacific, and had occupied all the German
islands north of the equator.
THE SECRET TREATIES OF 1917

During the early months of 1917, Japan turned to diplomacy in
order to be sure that she would be able to keep her territorial
gains after the war. The United States had not yet entered the
war, and the military fortunes of the Allied powers in Europe
were at a low ebb. iVIaking good use of this situation, Japan
negotiated secret treaties with Britain, France, Russia and
Italy. Signed in February and March 1917, these agreements
pledged that Japan's claims to the German islands north of
the equator and to the former German rights in Shantung
would be supported at the peace conference. But the Japanese
did not secure American support of these claims. In the LansingIshii agreement of November 2, 1917, the United States offered
merely a qualified recognition of Japan's "special interests in
China."
The secret treaties with the Allied powers were shrewdly
drawn and enabled Japan to come off victorious at the Paris
Peace Conference. Her newly established position in Shantung province, as well as the extensions of her rights in South
Manchuria, were accepted and written into the Versailles
Treaty. The German islands north of the equator were
awarded Japan as a Class C mandate, the kind of mandate
which came closest to annexation. American opposition to these
decisions cut no ice, mainly because of Japan's secret agreements with the Allies. On only one big issue was Japan de60
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feated at the conference. Her statesmen had demanded that
a clause on racial equality be inserted in the peace treaty.
This demand was rej ected, largely because the Western powers
were afraid that it would let down the bars against Japanese
immigration to their countries.
FLIES IN THE OINTMENT

But despite the acceptance of her territorial gains at the peace
conference, by 1919 Japan's difficulties were increasing. A
student uprising in Peking drove out the pro-Japanese Anfu
clique that had controlled the Chinese government. Opposition
to the Shantung award was growing in the United States, and
the American navy was rapidly becoming the most powerful
in the world. Two years later Japan's position had become still
weaker. A boycott was severely reducing Japanese trade in
China. The costs of the naval-building race with the United
States were a heavy burden. Japanese intervention in Siberia,
which continued after the armed forces of the Western powers
had been withdrawn, was not succeeding. And expenditure on
the Siberian occupation, ultimately totaling about 800 million
yen, together with the naval-building costs, was straining the
Japanese budget. These various factors were discrediting the
Japanese militarists at home, and liberal Japanese ':Vere beginning to speak out against them
SLOWING DOWN JAPAN'S DRIVE

Under these conditions, the United States was able to summon
the Washington Conference, at which important agreements
on naval limitation and Pacific questions were reached early
in 1922. By accepting a battleship ratio of 3 tons as against
5 each for Britain and the United States, Japan was relieved
of the costs of the naval race. Her security in Far Eastern
waters was further increased by the provision restricting fortification of island bases in the Pacific. The F our-Power Pact,
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signed by Britain, France, the u. S. and Japan, and pledging
respect for insular possessions in the Pacific, replaced the
Anglo-Japanese Alliance.
In return for these contributions to her security in Far Eastern waters, Japan made a number of important concessions.
By an agreement with China, she restored Shantung province
to Chinese control. Japan also signed the Nine-Power Treaty,
which pledged all its signatories to respect China's territorial
and administrative integrity and the "open door"-or equal
commercial opportunity for all nations-in China.
In later days, some of the provisions of these Washington
Conference agreements came to be bitterly attacked in Japan,
especially by military and naval extremists. It is an open question as to how far these criticisms were justified. It was chiefly
the effectiveness of the Chinese boycott that forced the restoration of Shantung province. Japan's major concession was in
the Nine-Power Treaty, by which she agreed to lay down the
sword and accept the results of peaceful commercial competition in China. But there was no machinery provided to enforce
this treaty. The naval limitation treaty relieved Japan of the
heavy costs of the 192 I naval race and at the same time, even
under the 5-5-3 ratio, left her able to dominate the China coast.
She was thus in a strategic position to renew her expansionist
program-which she did in 193 I.
WORLD WAR GAINS

Moreover, the W orld War settlement for Japan, as finally
reached at Washington, was no empty achievement. Japan had
not obtained her larger ambitions in China or Siberia, it is true.
But the former German islands north of the equator-of great
strategic, if not economic, importance-were now a Japanese
mandate. Japan's rights in South Manchuria had become much
more firmly established. Her naval and commercial fleets had
greatly expanded, she occupied a permanent seat on the Coun63

cll of the League of Nations, and she was recognized as one
of the half-dozen Great Powers. Japan had also made important
economic gains, to w~ich we must now tum our attention.
THE WAR BOOM
It was 'in the economic field, perhaps, that Japan reaped her
greatest gains from the World War. For her shops and factories
were kept busy supplying the belligerent countries, their
colonial populations, and the American market. Her allies controlled the seas, and Japanese ships sailed all of them. This freedom of the seas was an important factor for Japan, who had
become increasingly dependent on international trade.
Japan's war boom was, in many respects, very similar to that
enjoyed by the United States. The relative increase in trade
was even greater. Between 1914 and 1920 Japan's total foreign
trade increased from 1,187 million yen to 4,285 million, or by
nearly four times (see chart, page 61). Through 1918, moreover, exports increased much faster than imports. For Japan
this meant a chance to stock up on her reserves of gold and
foreign currencies, which had always been low. In the 19 14- 18
period, exports outran imports by 1,460 million yen. This figure contrasted with an import excess of 1,158 million yen during the preceding 20 years.
What we have said so far applies only to trade in goods. But
returns on invisible trade items, such as shipping services, were
also high-totaling more than 1,500 million yen for the 1914-18
period. The wartime balances for both types of trade came to
more than 3,000 million yen-on the right side of the ledger.
As a result, Japan's financial reserves greatly increased. Extensive loans and investments were made in foreign countries, and
large holdings in gold and foreign exchange were piled up.
Japan emerged from the war stronger financially and economically than she had ever been before. Nevertheless, she was
to suffer a series of economic setbacks in the post-war period.

x.

Go Liberal, Go Fascist?

Even before the war ended, there had been signs of economic
distress within Japan. While the profits from the war boom
were going into the pockets of a small group, a sharp rise in
the cost of living had caused suffering among the masses of the
people. Speculators were profiteering in rice, which soared
from 20 or 25 yen to more than 50 yen on the five-bushel unit.
In the summer of 1918 there were serious "rice riots," and
troops were called out to suppress the demonstrations. During
the war, moreover, trade union and socialist ideas had taken
root in Japan, paving the way for the growth of labor unions
and left-:-wing parties in the post-war years.
UPS AND DOWNS

Then came the world slump in 1920-2 I, which led to a sudden
collapse of Japan's war boom. Partial recovery had no sooner
set in than it received a sharp jolt from the disastrous earthquake of 1923 . To meet these setbacks, Japan drew heavily
on the financial reserves accumulated during the war. Reconstruction after the earthquake created another short-lived boom
-ended by a bank panic in 1927.
Despite post-war difficulties, however, Japan managed to
keep her industry on the up grade. The great advances made
during the war were maintained and consolidated. In the postwar slump the number of factory workers had declined, but
in 1927-28 they reached the wartime level of 2,000,000 again.
Throughout the 'twenties, except for a sharp drop in 1921,
Japan's total foreign trade continued to hold the new average
level of 4,000 million yen. Population leaped forward, from
about 50 million persons in 1914 to 56 million in 1920, and to
nearly 65 million in 1930 (see chart, page 69).

BIG BUSINESS TO THE FORE

During and after the war, Japan's business groups had come
of age. They were no longer subordinate to the other ruling
forces in the state. Japan's effort to overtake the West, as we
noticed, had led to a close tie-up between government and
industry. This relationship had made it easy for Japan's great
business houses to become monopolies. From the beginning
they had united banking, trade and industry under one roof.
Post-war developments, such as the financial crisis of 1927, had
carried the process of financial concentration beyond even
what was characteristic of Western countries. By this time
half-a-dozen of Japan's huge family combines, such as Mitsui
and Mitsubishi, dominated Japanese economy. They had
become one of the most powerful financial ruling groups in
the world.
BUT INDUSTRY DEPENDS ON FOREIGN TRADE

And here we have to point out the striking paradox in Japan's '
new economic society. It was still largely agricultural. In 1925
more than half the people were dependent on agriculture for
their livelihood. But the peasants were too poor to buy the
typical consumption goods (automobiles, for example) that
were staples in the home markets of Western countries. Thus
it was impossible for Japan to develop modern factory industries turning out all lines of consumption goods. Only in cotton textiles, with their special export market, and in shipbuilding and metallurgy, serving the army and navy, were largescale factories practical. In 1928 the greater part of Japan's
manufactured-goods was produced in industrial units employing ten, five or even fewer workers. Firms like Mitsui and Mitsubishi, however, contracted for the output of these smallscale industrial units and then sold it, often in foreign markets.
Thus Japan, although she had made great strides in some
lines of industry, had become dangerously dependent on inter66
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On Iy key enterprises wh ich
supplement one another are
shown. Mitsui controls many
others.

national trade. After 1929, with the onset of the world depression, the difficulties of this situation were plain to see. Quotas
and tariffs barred even Japan's low-priced goods. Old sores
rankled, particularly those affecting immigration. The Exclusion Act, passed by the American Congress over the President's
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disapproval in 1924, cut the deepest. In fact, it undid most of
the good effects of the generous aid America gave Japan after
the earthquake in 1923.
THE LIBERALS TAKE A HAND

These post-war years, especially after 192 I, witnessed a brief
flovvering of parliamentary democracy in Japan. None of the
architects of the Constitution, least of all Ito, had foreseen this
possibility. Yet in the late 'twenties it seemed as if the Cabinet
might win unchallenged power, that party government would
reign supreme, and that the House of Representatives would
become the true seat of authority.
This change came about quite naturally, through the increasing influence of the great business houses. By 1925 the industrialists and the bankers, or their representatives, held many of
the leading offices which the clansmen had formerly made their
own. They held the presidency of the Privy Council, and the
key posts in the Imperial Household Ministry. They were influential in the House of Peers, in the bureaucracy and even in
the Army and Navy. Generals and admirals could actually be
found to support the policies of party governments. All the
Elder Statesmen except Prince Saionji had died. And even he,
being related to the Sumitomo banking house, was in sympathy
with the capitalist outlook. As Prince Saionji was the Emperor's
chief adviser on the choice of a new Premier, he occupied the
most strategic position in the state. In the 1925-3 1 period, on
his nomination, six consecutive governments were formed by
party Premiers holding majorities in the Diet's lower house.
POLITICAL PARTIES

Party influence, increasing with the growth of capitalism in
Japan, reached its height during these years. At an earlier period
the clan bureaucrats had manipulated the parties to suit themselves-usually with little difficulty. But as time passed, the
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parties formed closer and closer ties with the great business
houses. Mitsubishi interests were linked with the Minseito
party, Mitsui with the Seiyukai party. The Election Law was
gradually amended, increasing the nU111ber of voters, until in
1925 manhood suffrage was adopted. This change forced Diet
members to spend large sums in electioneering, and made
them more dependent on capitalist support. Consequently, it
strengthened the capitalists' control over the Minseito and the
Seiyukai. At the same time it made possible the rise of labor
and left-wing parties, which began to win Diet seats.
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After 1925 the Cabinets formed by the Minseito and Seiyukai
parties began to have to account directly to their majorities
in the House of Representatives for what they did. Parliamentary government was by no means fully established, however. An adverse vote in the lower house did not, as a rule,
overthrow these Cabinets. More often they fell because of
backstage maneuvers in the Privy Council or the House of
Peers. Nor were their leaders and policies always liberal. For
a time General Baron Tanaka was president of the Seiyukai.
He represented the aggressive, militarist wing of the Choshu
clan. The Seiyukai Cabinet of 1927-29, formed under his
Premiership, carried out a "positive policy" of military intervention in China. Tanaka had to be a party leader in order to
become Premier. But his policy showed the strength of old
tendencies, even in a generally liberal era.
On the other hand, the succeeding Minseito Cabinet (19293 I) was the strongest and most liberal party government which
has ever held office in Japan. It came the nearest to establishing
democracy there. It also had to meet the first onslaught of the
military-fascist forces that have since become so powerful. In
"the story of Japan's political development, it thus represents a
critical turning point of unusual significance.
SWAN SONG OF THE JAPANESE LIBERALS

The Minseito Cabinet of 1929-3 I was liberal, but by no means
radical. It was, in reality, a government of "big business." Its
liberalism stood out mainly in its moderate foreign policy,
which contrasted sharply with Tanaka's earlier aggressive
moves. It was headed by distinguished leaders: Hamaguchi
(Premier), Shidehara (Foreign Minister) and Inouye (Finance
Minister).
This Cabinet labored, however, under a fatal handicap, similar to that which confronted President Hoover in our own
country. For it entered office in July 1929, at the height of the
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post-war boO'm. The Wall Street crash, and the spreading
WO'rld depression, immediately fO'liowed. The swift change in
ecO'nO'mic cO'nditiO'ns during its periO'd in O'ffice had' much to' dO'
with its final O'verthrO'w.
Hamaguchi and his Cabinet aides began with a great victory
on the issue of the LO'ndO'n Naval Treaty of 1930'. This treaty
extended limitatiO'ns to' cruisers and destrO'yers, as well as capital ships. The army and navy die-hards O'PPO'sed it bitterly. The
peO'ple and the press SUpPO'rted the Cabinet's fight fO'r it. On
OctO'ber I, 1930' the Privy CO'uncil ratified the treaty. The
Cabinet and the peO'ple had wO'n.
F O'r the mO'ment it seemed as if the Cabinet had brO'ught the
army and navy under cO'ntrO'I. Real demO'cracy seemed possible.
But the triumph was shO'rt-lived. It was the swan song O'f parliamentary gO'vernment in Japan. In NO'vember 1930 Premier
Hamaguchi was shO't by an assassin; eight mO'nths later he died
from his wounds. His loss seriO'usly weakened the Cabinet, and
cut dO'wn its chance O'f success O'n new issues which were
developing.
, THE DEPRESSION STRIKES JAPAN

By the end O'f 1930 the depressiO'n had struck Japan with full
fO'rce. It laid the Cabinet O'pen to' attack by the rising militaryfascist fO'rces.
The most serious consequences of the depressiO'n were felt
in Japan's fO'reign trade. In 1929 Japan's export-import trade
stoO'd at 4,365 milliO'n yen. In 1930' it fell to' 3,0'16 milliO'n, and
in 1931 to' 2,J83 million. In twO' years Japan's trade was cut
nearly in half. Even at that periO'd, few Western cO'untries suffered such a rapid and severe cO'ntractiO'n O'f their fO'reign trade..
The effects O'f this decline O'n Japan's ecO'nO'my were catastrO'phic. Agriculture and industry were , bO'th hard hit. The
incO'me frO'm rice and silk declined until there was actual famine
in some rural districts. Industrial unemployment mounted to'

three million, higher than ever before in Japan. The middleclass professionals and wage-earners suffered wage cuts, or
were thrown out of work. There was general social unrest, and
Marxist doctrines won a wide acceptance. Strikes in industry,
and tenant conflicts in rural areas, became commonplace.
In the light of these conditions, the weaknesses of Japan's
economy stood out in bold relief. Fully half the home ma.~ket
consisted of poverty-stricken peasants. To put the rt;tral population back on its feet and enable it to buy the products of
industry, drastic social reforms, such as rent reductions and
debt moratoria for the farmers, were obviously needed. Neither
the landowners nor the great business houses were prepared to
embark on such a "new deal." The army had a different solution-aggressive expansion abroad and military-fascist repression at home.
This army program led to a finish fight with the Minseito
Cabinet. And the army leaders fought-and won-their campaign in Manchuria.
THE ARMY STRIKES IN MANCHURIA

The Minseito Cabinet had been trying to pursue a "friendly
policy" toward China. Baron Shidehara, the Foreign Minister,
wanted friendly relations with all countries. In this way he
sought to foster Japan's foreign trade, and thus solve Japan's
economic problems. But he could not control the army, especially after the depression had cut down trade and brought
unrest to Japan.
During the summer of 193 I a series of "incidents" occurred
in Manchuria, in which the hand of the military was plainly to
be seen. At home in Japan the army used these incidents to
arouse popular support for "positive" action in defense of supposedly threatened Japanese interests. Gen~ral Minami, new
War Minister in the Cabinet, openly supported this propaganda
campaign. Baron Shidehara attempted to reach a peaceful
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settlement of the Manchurian issues. But in vain. On September 18, 193 I~the historic date we mentioned at the beginning
of this book-the army struck in Manchuria. The "Mukden
incident" -alleged blowing up of a section of the South Manchuria Railway track-served as an excuse for the Japanese
army to occupy the chief Manchurian cities.
This independent coup d'etat by the army dealt a fatal blow
to the Minseito Cabinet. Baron Shidehara was forced into the
position of apologizing for the army's actions, though he must
have heartily detested them. On December I I, 193 I the Cabinet
resigned.

XI.

The Shadow Deepens

The fall of the Minseito Cabinet marked the end of an era.
The crisis of 1930-3 I had unleashed new forces. And these
forces were destined to mold Japan's policy in the decade that
followed.
At their head was the army. Not all of the army leaders,
however. At times the "army extremists" seemed to be only a
small minority. Their power rose and fell. Yet they took command of Japan's foreign policy, and gained more and more control over her domestic policy. And as time passed, their outlook
was increasingly stamped on the army as a whole.
THE ARMY EXTREMISTS

Who were the army extremists? Names are not important,
except as labels of a whole group. There has been no outstanding fascist leader in Japan, such as Mussolini in Italy or Hitler
in Germany. It is enough for us to note that, in the 1930-32
period, the high army leadership centered in three generals-
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Araki, Muto and Mazaki. This trio was supported by a powerful group of "young officers," such as Doihara . and Itagaki,
who have since become ranking generals.
These men were not from the old clan aristocracy. They
came mostly from the lesser clans, or from the middle classes
in town and village. They knew at first hand the sufferings of
the farmers and the small tradesmen. Like M ussolini and Hitler,
they claimed to be the friend of the common man. They bitterly ''denounced the "corrupt alliance" of the political parties
and the capitalists.
All this was part of their fight for political control at home.
They wa~ted a "national socialist" reformation in Japan. By
this they meant that the army, under the Emperor, should run
the government. They wanted the political parties suppressed
and industry run by the state-all, as they said, for the benefit
of the conlmon man.
On the home front, the army extremists have had little success. None of their glowing promises of economic "reforms"
has been carried out. In the foreign field, however, their program has been largely adopted. We must now see what their
aims in foreign policy were.
THE DEMAND FOR "LiVING SPACE"

At the heart of the military-fascist program in Japan, just as
in Germany and Italy, lay a demand for territorial expansion.
The army extremists made careful plans for a series of bold
moves. First, Manchuria and Mongolia were to be conquered,
then China, then the rest of Asia. In the past decade we have
seen this seemingly wild and visionary program translated into
reality to an extraordinary degree. In fact, the actual course
of Japan's foreign policy has follow~d it very .closely.
With territorial expansion was linked an economic ideathat of regional self-sufficiency, or the "bloc economy." In
193 I, Manchuria was called Japan's "economic life-line." In
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1932-33 the watchword was the "Japan-Manchou~uo economic
bloc." After 1937 the demand was for a "Japan-China-Manchoukuo bloc." Finally, the slogan today is for a "Greater East

Asia," to include the rich territories of Indo-China, Malaya,
the East Indies and the Philippines.
.
What the army leaders were chiefly seeking through this
program was to overcome Japan's dependence on the international market. They were proposing a basic alternative to
Shidehara's plan for the peaceful development of international
trade. In 1930-31 they had seen Japan's foreign trade suddenly
collapse, plunging the country into an economic crisis. They
were determined that this should not happen again. The
answer, they felt, lay in extending Japan's political control
over a vast region. The markets and raw materials of such an
area, they thought, would make Japan economically independent of the rest of the world.
WEIGHTING THE SCALES

The army extremists were not the only ones to share these
views. They had supporters in the bureaucracy, even in the
highest positions. Many naval officers also supported them,
although the navy as a whole was more conservative than the
army. And, despite their anti-capitalist propaganda, they had
close relations with some business groups who hoped to profit
from the expansion program.
Though the military-fascist leaders did not succeed in
organizing a unified mass fascist party, they wielded extraordinary powers. They influenced public opinion through the
Ex-Servicemen's Association, with its three million members.
They also had a host of reactionary so~ieties to work through.
S<:>me of them were dignified patriotic societies, with members
from the highest ranks of Japanese society. Others went in for
espionage, strike-breaking, or outright terrorism. Finally, the
army had its special powers under the Constitution, such as
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dictating the choice of War Minister, and going direct to the
Emperor over the head of the Premier.
To all these powers the extremists now added two special
techniques and used them for all they were worth. One was
resorting directly to military action, without waiting for
authorization from the Cabinet. Underlings in the field could
plot "incidents" which committed their superior officers and
the government to certain courses of action. The Manchurian
occupation was largely brought about in this way.
The second technique was terrorism, or direct action, against
political opponents at home. Public opinion in Japan does not
automatically condemn assassination, especially if it appears to \
have been inspired by patriotic or disinterested motives. The
list of distinguished Japanese who have been assassinated is
very long-Okubo, Ito, Hara (the first commoner to become
Premier), Hamaguchi, to mention a few. Since 1931 many
others have been added to this list, and their deaths have all
helped the military-fascists to rise to power.
AGAINST THE ARMY?

On the surface it has often seemed that the capitalists were the
chief opponents of the army extremists in the political struggle
of the past decade. This is only partly true. These two groups
have been the strongest political forces in Japan. They {lave
both sought to win the bureaucrats and public opinion to their
side. On the other hand, they are in agreement on many points.
For the capitalists, as well as the military, are interested in
territorial expansion, and have taken advantage of its results
in China. Many of them favored the Manchurian invasion,
because they saw that it would give the widespread social discontent in Japan a safe outlet. But at the same time, the capitalists tend to be more cautious than the army leaders in foreign policy. They do not want to take risks, or to plunge recklessly into a big war if the chances of success are slight.,
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Even on the home front, there is an area of agreement
between the army extremists and the business men. Both wish
to maintain their ruling position against the threat of social
revolution. The Minseito government took measures to stamp
out revolutionary groups as early as 1929-30. There is full
agreement on regimentation of this kind. But the capitalists
have bitterly opposed the army's efforts to take over all political power, or to seize control of their business enterprises.
Keeping these general tendencies in mind, we can now turn
to a consideration of the events of the past decade.
THE EXTREMISTS TAKE DIRECT ACTION

The "Mukden incident" of September 18, 1931 marked the
halfway point in the sharp political struggle which was then
convulsing Japan. Its violent phase la.sted for eight months
longer, until May IS, 193 2 •
We have already seen the first result of this struggle-the
overthrow of the Minseito Cabinet. The Seiyukai party took
up the reins of power in mid-December 193 I. It proved to be
the last one-party government to hold office during that
decade. Inukai, its Premier, was a moderate; so also was Takahashi, the aged Finance Minister. General Araki, symbol and
titular leader of the army extremists, was the Minister of War.
Not content with having forced a change of Cabinet, the
extremists still pressed the attack on party government. Inouye,
Finance Minister in the previous Minseito Cabinet, was assassinated on February 9, and Baron Dan, head of the Mitsui
interests, was shot on March 5. Both were victims of the
Blood Brotherhood League, organized to use terrorism against
the "corrupt political parties, slaves of the capitalists." More
plots followed. Then, on May IS, 1932, Premier Inukai in turn
was assassinated. His death was the climax of an outbreak supported by high army officers, who had planned to seize control of the government.
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CONQUEST IN MANCHURIA

After this affair, things quieted down a little at home. But the
extremists had meanwhile had their way in the sphere of foreign policy. Japanese 'troops had spread over most of Manchuria. In February the Japanese attack on Shanghai had
occurred. In March the "independent" state of Manchoukuo
was established. Far from being independent, it was really the
plaything of Japan's army extremists who had planned the
"Mukden incident."
Another year passed before the Manchurian issues were fully
ironed out. In September 1932 the Japanese government formally recognized Manchouku9. Early in 1933, on the basis of
the Lytton Report, the League of Nations passed judgment
on Japan. The army at once moved again in Manchuria. In
March 1933 Japanese troops occupied J ehol province, and
added it to Manchoukuo. In lVlay these troops advanced to the
gates of Peiping and Tientsin, and enforced "demilitarization"
of the region immediately south of the Great Wall of China.
Meanwhile, Japan had withdrawn from the League of Nations.
F or the time, her conquest of l\1anchuria had been made good
in her own eyes, if not in the eyes of the world.
PEACEFUL INTERLUDE (1933-35)

The period from the middle of 1933 to the end of 1935 was
"peaceful" only by contrast with the years before and after.
The contrast is sufficiently striking, however, to justify our
using the term.
Two strong Cabinets, headed in turn by Admirals Saito and
Okada, old-line naval administrators opposed to extremism,
governed Japan during these years. The Saito Cabinet had
entered office in May 1932, after the death of Inukai. Party
men held only a few of the lesser Ministries. Nevertheless, the
Cabinet was in the main moderate. The key Finance Ministry,
in particular, was in the capable hands of Takahashi, Who
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allowed only limited increases in the defense budgets. Early
in 1934 the fiery Araki resigned from the War MiniStry.
Araki's successor carried out a partial "purge" of the army
extremists.
KEEPING THE ARMY QUIET

There were several reasons for this moderate trend. For one
thing, foreign trade had turned upwards in 1932, and by 1935
Japan was again enjoying a trade boom which soon overcame
the worst effects of the economic crisis and tended to calm
the political waters.
In the second place, the army extremists were kept busy
with their experiment in Manchoukuo, where they were trying
to realize their goal of "state socialism." They were building
strategic railways, and fostering the growth of Manchurian
industry. They met with opposition from business interests at
home, and found it hard to raise sufficient capital for their
projects in Manchuria. In order to secure greater influence
over these economic questions, the extremists forced the establishment inside the Cabinet of a lVlanchoukuo Affairs Board.
Here the army was in the saddle. And the extremists did secure
enough capital for their projects to provoke the wise old
Takahashi into issuing a warning that Japan's finances could
not stand such a large and continuing investment drain: to
lVlanchoukuo.
On the whole, however, the army men were disappointed
with the economic results in Manchoukuo. By 1935 they were
trying to bring North China into their Manchurian realm, and
thus enlarge their economic bloc. In November 1935 Doihara,
the "Lawrence of Manchuria," tried to detach five of the
northern provinces from Chinese control. The extremists also
planned these moves as part of an effort to strengthen their
position at home. For there they were being steadily pushed
into the background.
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DYING FLICKERS OF DEMOCRACY

Plots were still being hatched within Japan, even during this
"peaceful" period. But the moderates were reasserting their
control. They kept the high posts in the Privy Council and
the Imperial Household Ministry. The Cabinet was firmly set
for a moderate course. Even the parties' strength was reviving.
The climax of this trend came with the general election of
February 1936. For the voting showed that the people had
swung decisively away from the extremists. Japan's labor party
elected eighteen Diet members" while three left-wing proletarians won Diet seats. It was thought that a new Cabinet, with
much greater party ~uence, might now be formed.
.
But the extremists were unwilling to admit defeat. Their
answer came in the military uprising of February 26, 1936known in Japan as the "2-26" affair.
THE 112-26

11 UPRISING

The direct participants in this historic revolt were some 1,400
troops, with their lower officers. No upper officers openly
joined them. Yet the insurgents had contact with the highest
army quarters. And General Mazaki, an outstanding army
extremist, was kept under detention for a year after the
outbreak.
A long death list had been ' prepared. Actually only three
high officials were killed: Takahashi, the moderate Finance
Minister; Admiral Saito, the former Premier, then Lord Privy
Seal; and General Watanabe, who had been responsible for
shifts in army officerships. Premier Okada escaped, but his
brother, who resembled him, was killed. Outside of Tokyo
both Count Makino, former Lord Privy Seal, and Prince
Saionji, the last Elder Statesman, managed to escape attacks
directed against them.
For three days the insurgents occupied the center of Tokyo~
They were finally disarmed when it became clear that the
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revolt was not taking hold anywhere else. Once again, an
attempt to seize the government had failed. Nevertheless, the
uprising caused an important shift in the balance of political
power. The trend toward moderation was reversed. Under
succeeding Cabinets, new policies were adopted which led
directly toward the war with China in 1937.
PRELUDE TO WAR (1936-37)

The chief result of the "2-26" uprising was to give greater
power over government policy to the army leaders. This power
was not exercised by the extremists in person, because the military revolt had temporarily discredited them in the people's
eyes. A new set of army leaders adopted most of their platform, however, and succeeded in putting it across. The public
strongly opposed the expansionist and military-fascist tendencies of the new program, but could do no more than delay
its realization.
The new program took definite shape under the Cabinet
headed by Hirota, a bureaucrat with extremist leanings. It
called for stronger pressure on China, expressed in demands for
"Sino-Japanese cooperation." The anti-Comintem pact was
concluded with Germany in November 1936. On the home
front, there were efforts to amend the Election Law in such
a way as to curb the political influence of the parties. The new
budget included large increases in defense expenditure. Sections of heavy industry, interested in the profits to be reaped
from supplying armaments for the defense services, threw their
support to the enlarged arms program. On the other hand, popular opposition to the Hirota Cabinet grew steadily. Following
strong attacks in the Diet, Hirota resigned in January 1937.
General Hayashi, the next Premier, barred the recognized
Minseito and Seiyukai party leaders from his Cabinet. Within
two months he had carried through the economic planks of
Hirota's platform. Ikeda and Yuki, representing the business
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houses, took official posts in order to handle the financial problems. Premier Hayashi also instituted a Cabinet Planning Board,
which became an economic general staff for the army program.
THE PEOPLE VS. THE MILITARY

These rapid steps toward a "wartime economy" met with bitter
opposition from the parties and even more from the public at
large. A wide breach opened up between the Hayashi Cabinet
and the people. When Hayashi dissolved the Diet, he was overwhelmingly defeated in the general election of April 1937.
Out of 466 members in the Diet's lower house, the government
elected less than 50 supporters. It tried to stay in office, but
finally, on l\1ay 31, had to resign.
The popular disapproval of the military-fascist program was
shown quite unmistakably in this election-even more unmistakably than in the earlier election of February 1936. At that
time, the extremists had defeated the will of the people by the
"2-26" uprising. This time they used ne\v methods.
Under the Konoye Cabinet, national unity was restored-at
least to all outward appearances. Party members were included
in the Cabinet, and Prince Konoye was made the symbol of
unity. But the party men chosen for Cabinet posts were in sympathy with the military-fascist program, and in any case held
only minor offices. The chief Ministries were cornered by the
army leaders and by bureaucrats who supported them.
But merely setting up a new Cabinet was not enough to quell
the widespread suspicion of the army's aims. It was necessary
to quiet opposition voices, reestablish the army's prestige and
really get somewhere with the "controlled economy" plans.
How could all this be done? Two months after the Konoye
Cabinet entered office, Japan was at war with China.

XII.

War with China

Few of Japan's leaders expected that the war with China would
last for years. Their original plans called for a short campaign
of five or six months. North China, Shanghai and Nanking
would be occupied. Chiang Kai-shek's crack divisions would
be destroyed in the Shanghai-Nanking operations. By Christmas, at the latest, a dictated peace could be imposed at Nanking.
VICTORIES WITHOUT PEACE

On the military side, these calculations proved surprisingly
accurate. The victorious Japanese troops were entering Nanking in mid-December. And all the strategic railways in North
China were under Japan's control. But these military successesdid not lead to the expected peace settlement. China's national
unity held firm, and Chinese resistance continued. If Japan
wished to dictate peace terms, she would have to wage further
battle.
This she proceeded to do. Two big campaigns were fought
during 1938. In May, after a bitter struggle in Shantung province, Japan's northern and southern armies were able to join
forces. In October, after an exhausting advance up the Yangtze
River, the Japanese captured Hankow. A lightning blow in the
south led to the occupation of Canton.
China's main cities, and much of her railway system, were
now in Japanese hands. But . still there was no sign of peace.
By the end of 1938, it was clear that, despite her military triumphs, Japan had not won victory. The war had lasted
eighteen months, instead of six. In lives and money, it had cost
Japan far more than the original reckoning. And the end was
not in sight.
What was happening at home during these first eighteen
months of the war? Three main trends were clear. First, all
popular opposition to the war was suppressed. Second, the
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military took over conduct of affairs in China, allowing the
Cabinet little or no say. And third, a "controlled economy"
was set up, although the army leaders did not succeed in getting it into their hands. The business houses either pared down
the controls, or decided how they were to be applied.
MAKING THE PUBLIC TOE THE LINE

Various measures to gain public support of the war were
adopted. The most spectacular was a campaign for "national
spiritual mobilization." It began on September 1I, 1937 with
a patriotic rally in Tokyo, addressed by the Premier and other
Cabinet Ministers and broadcast throughout the country. In
the Diet the parties expressed their support of the war. Even
Japan's labor party, which had elected 36 Diet members in
April 1937, swung behind the war policy. The authorities were
not content, however. In December 1937, the Home Ministry
carried out large-scale police raids, in which hundreds of persons were arrested. Two left-wing labor and party groups, both
headed by Kanju Kato, were disbanded without notice. Kato
himself, who had been elected to the Diet by a proletarian constituency in Tokyo, was jailed. The arrests also included
Baroness Ishimoto, a noted feminist leader, and a great many
liberals and pacifists.
All sections of Japan's ruling circles were united in this program of suppressing popular opposition to the war. There was
more scope for disagreement, however, over how the war in
China should be conducted. But in this dispute the army held
all the points of vantage, and soon reigned supreme.
THE ARMY WINS A FREE HAND IN CHINA

Control of military and naval operations in and off China was
given in November 1937 to the Imperial Headquarters. This
special organ included all the high army and navy officers.
Since it decided military policy under the direct authority of
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the Emperor, it neatly sidetracked Cabinet control. Non-military phases of policy in China, however, were not so easily
disposed of. Here the army used a technique which it had tried
and tested in Manchuria. In September 1938 army leaders
forced the establishment of a China Affairs Board, set up within
the Cabinet but run by military men. Through this board the
army kept economic and political affairs in China pretty well
under its thumb, despite some continued opposition from the
Foreign Ministry. In the broader field of international policy
the struggle for power was more acute. It still continues,
although the army eventually became strong enough to put
through the alliance with Germany and Italy.
THE ECONOMIC WAR MACHINE

The third main trend of which we spoke was the establishment
of a wartime "controlled economy" in Japan. The state took
over more and more control of the economic life of the country. Both army and businessmen agreed that such control was
necessary, but bitterly disagreed as to how it should be applied.
On the whole, the businessmen managed to keep the most
important economic regulations in their own hands.
The fiercest political struggle during 1938 was waged over
the National Mobilization Bill. Drafted by the Planning Board
under army influence, this measure called for drastic economic
conscription. The government was to have practically unlimited control of social and economic life, including finance,
industry, trade, labor and the press. With respect to labor, the
bill provided for compulsory allocation of workers to their
jobs, prohibited strikes and lockouts, and empowered the government to fix wages, hours and working conditions.
This bill met with determined opposition in the Diet. Army
supporters, using pressure and intimidation, including terroristic attacks on Diet members and on party headquarters in
Tokyo, pushed it through. Nevertheless, the opposition did
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force certain modifications in the original plan. Premier
Konoye pledged that it would be applied only. during a wartime emergency and not invoked in the Sino-Japanese conflict, ,
which was still referred to in Japan as an "incident." The
Premier also agreed to appoint a majority of Diet members
to the National Mobilization Council. This Council was to be
consulted before Imperial ordinances applying various sections
of the bill were issued.
But on May 5, 1938, despite Konoye's pledge to the Diet,
several of the main provisions of the bill were applied, and new
ordinances issued since have put many others into effect.
Before Premier Konoye's resignation in January 1939, a broad
series of control measures was in operation. Foreign exchange
was strictly licensed. To make up the huge war budgets the
government had taken over control of capital, and restricted
new investment to a list of so-called "essential" industries. It
also rigidly regulated trade, limiting the export and impon of
several hundred commodities. It put the labor control provisions of the National Mobilization Act into effect. In June
1938 it instituted nation-wide price control for certain commodities, and has since steadily increased the list of such goods.
The Home Ministry enrolled several thousand "economic
police" officers to enforce the price schedules and other features of the economic program.
THE MEN AT THE CONTROLS

But despite the sweeping nature of these provISIons, the
business houses managed to keep a fair amount of independence. Their own men took key positions in many of the
agencies that were enforcing the control measures. In the field
of capital investment, they could still tip the scales. They successfully resisted army pressure for outright state control and
operation of industry. Nationalization of the vital electric
power industry, for instance, over which they fought long and
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bitterly, was finally put through only part way, and has been
a subject of continued dispute.
So it was not the military leaders alone, but the military leaders in an uneasy partnership with the businessmen and the
party heads, who carried out the wartime economic program.
The army fascists charted the program, it is true, but they were
not allo,ved to run it in their own sweet way. The army ruled
in China, as it had in Manchuria. But it was not the unchallenged dictator at home. There, it shared power with "big business." And big business, despite war restrictions, still operated
its own enterprises and still reaped its dividends.
STALEMATE IN CHINA

A Cabinet under Prince Konoye had held office throughout the
first phase of the war in China. It resigned in January 1939,
when China's refusal to accept a dictated peace had become
unmistakable. For Japan now no longer won spectacular victories. A stalemate had developed, and the war had become
a war of attrition. This second phase of the war lasted for
another eighteen months-until June 1940, when Hitler's victories in Europe shifted the balance of power in the Far East.
The costs to Japan of this second period were no less than
before. She had to maintain the same number of troops in
China, totaling 800,000 or 1,000,000. Heavy fighting was taking place almost continuously. But the hostilities, ranging from
Canton to Inner Mongolia, led to no decisive results. In some
cases Japan occupied new cities, such as Nanchang, Nanning
and Ichang. In other cases Japanese offensives were disastrously
routed. Chinese guerrillas, ranging far and wide, limited Japan's
area of effective control, even in the so-called "occupied" territory. Moreover, the economic gains were not as great as the
army had expected. Sales of Japanese goods to China steadily
increased, but imports of Chinese raw materials either declined
or rose very slowly.

STEPPING ON WESTERN TOES

At the same time Japan's interference with the interests of the
Western powers in China became much more direct, and created serious friction. Difficulties were most acute at Tientsin,
Shanghai and Amoy. The Japanese army imposed various
restrictions. It kept Western shipping off the Yangtze River
above Shanghai, and the Pearl River below Canton. Western
traders had to face many practices-tariffs, exchange controls,
import and export controls-which were put into effect especially to hamper their trade. The Japanese enforced a blockade
of the British and French Concessions at Tientsin, and stripped
British citizens for examination before allowing them to enter
or leave their Concession. Although the Western powers
resented these Japanese actions, they limited their opposition
mainly to protests. In July 1939 the United States abrogated
its trade treaty with Japan, but did not follow up this step by
imposing trade penalties.
THREE JAPANESE WAR CABINETS

Difficulties on Japan's home front mounted steadily during the
second phase of the war. The strain was shown in many ways.
One was the rapidity with which Cabinets succeeded one
another. The first Konoye Cabinet, as we have seen, had held
office for nineteen months-from June 1937 to January 1939.
In the second period (January 1939 to July 1940), there were
no less than three Cabinets. Their average length of life was
only six months. These Cabinets, with their Premiers, held
office as follows:
I. Baron Kiichiro Hiranuma, January 5, 1939 to August
29, 1939
2. General Nobuyuki Abe, August 30, 1939 to January
IS, 1940
3. Admiral Mitsumasa Yonai, January 16, 1940 to July
16, 1940.
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HIRANUMA AND THE NAZI-SOVIET PACT

Many of the decisive events of this period were closely related
to the Cabinet changes. Hiranuma, for example, was forced
out of office by the Soviet-German pact of August 23, 1939.
During that summer the Hiranuma Cabinet had been dickering
with Germany over the details of a proposed military pact,
while the Japanese army had been fighting a minor war with
the Soviet Union on the Outer Mongolian frontier. So the
Soviet-German pact came as a stunning blow to Tokyo, and
for a time feelings against Germany ran high. The army
extremists, who had strongly advocated an alliance with Germany, were discredited along with Hiranuma. Consequently,
extremist influence was not so great in the next two Cabinets,
headed by General Abe and Admiral Yonai.
ABE AND THE PRICE OF RICE

The Abe Cabinet was overthrown five months later for reasons
entirely different, but equally significant. Here the issue turned
mainly on Japan's growing economic difficulties. During the
winter of 1939-40 a rice shortage developed, and "bootleg"
prices soared toward 50 yen per koku (the five bushel unit)dangerously close to the level which stimulated the "rice riots"
of 1918. In September 1938 the Abe Cabinet had fixed ceilings
on all prices. When the rice shortage developed, it had to back
down on its own ruling. In November it raised the official
price from 38 to 43 yen per koku. By this time, however, the
farmers had already sold their crops, and the gains were reaped
by the rice dealers.
Outspoken criticisms were expected in the Diet and, rather
than meet them, the Abe Cabinet resigned in mid-January. The
incoming Yonai Cabinet had to face the music. One outspoken
member of the Minseito party, Takao Saito, challenged not
only economic conditions, but the war itself. His striking
speech of February 2, 1940 attacked Wang Ching-wei's pro89

posed regime (Japan's puppet government) in China as nothing more than a "central government in name." After casting
doubt on the prospects of achieving the "new order in East
Asia," he asked what the Japanese people had received in
return for their great sacrifices in the war. Even more serious,
in the eyes of Japan's army leaders, was Saito's declaration that,
in view of China's large territory and army, it "is doubtful
whether Japan can overthrow" Chiang Kai-shek's regime. A
critical electric power "famine" which developed at this time,
and forced many factories to shut down, underlined the truth
in Saito's remarks. The Japanese people backed Saito so
strongly that several months passed before the authorities
dared to expel him from the Diet.
YONAI TRAILS TOO FAR BEHIND NAZI PUSH

But Hitler's military victories in the spring of 1940, and especially the ,defeat of France, swiftly altered Japan's position in
the Far East. The "moderation" which the Abe and Yonai
Cabinets had shown in foreign policy suddenly vanished.
Intense pressure was brought to bear on the French authorities
in the Far East. In June the French Ambassador at Tokyo
agreed to stop shipments of goods to China over the IndoChina Railway. Less than a month later, the British government also bowed to the Japanese demand that the Burma Road
be closed for three months. But these gains were not enough
for the extremist elements within Japan. They had received
a fresh impetus from Hitler's successes, and were prepared to
move far more boldly both on the home and foreign fronts.
The War Minister, maneuvering for the set-up of an equally
bold and impetuous Cabinet, suddenly offered his resignation.
Thus, on July 16, 1940, the Yonai Cabinet crumbled.

XIII.

Shadow Over Asia

Under the second Konoye Cabinet, formed July 22, 1940,
the flood that had been sweeping over Japan since 1931 reached
a new high. Territorial aims were enlarged. Expansion was no
longer to be confined to China. The goal was now a "Greater
East Asia," including all the rich colonial territories in southern
Asiatic waters. At home, also, the pace quic.kened. The army
leaders moved toward full suppression of the parties, and a
reduction of the Diet's powers. Obstacles to foreign expansion
and internal regimentation continued to exist, however, and
slowed down the fascist advance.
In foreign policy, the Konoye Cabinet made two far-reaching moves. On September 27, 1940 it concluded a military alliance with Germany and Italy. By this alliance, as we have seen,
Japan was allotted "Greater East Asia" for her "living space."
This sphere, however, was not yet under Japanese control. It
had to be won. So the second move was a step in the direction
of winning it. It was a move into Indo-China.
In September 1940, a French-Japanese agreement admitted
a limited number of Japanese troops to northern districts of the
French colony of Indo-China. These troops were the entering
wedge. Then Japan pushed her control southward to Saigon.
Early in 194 I, Tokyo dictated a settlement of the ThailandIndo-China conflict, which she hoped would eventually yield
her full control of Indo-China, and still greater powers over
Thailand, where Japanese influence was already strong. And
Saigon, we should add, is only 650 miles north of Singapore.
A HARD ROW TO HOE

In other respects, however, the Konoye Cabinet's expansionist
program-like that of its predecessors-did not enjoy easy
going. For the war in China was still not won. In November
1940 Japan formally recognized Wang Ching-wei's Nanking
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regime (the puppet government she herself had created). But
this step merely spotlighted Japan's failure to secure peace in
China. Tokyo also undertook negotiations with the Soviet
Union, but with little immediate result. Finally, the British
and the Dutch strengthened the defenses of both Malaya and
the Netherlands Indies, and the American fleet at Hawaii served
as an eloquent warning against any move by Japan on Singapore, strategic key to southeast Asia.
THE HOME FRONT

On the home front, the Konoye Cabinet clamped down even
firmer dictatorial control. All political parties "voluntarily"
dissolved in the summer of 1940. There was a plan afoot to
curb the Diet's influence by amending the Election Law to
give fewer people votes. And the extremists began to organize
a mass fascist party, with local units throughout the country.
These efforts achieved some practical results. The outspoken
criticism marking previous Diet sessions was less apparent in
1940-41. The "near neighbor" groups, set up by the new fascist
party, gave the authorities a means of checking up closely on
popular opinion, and taking measures to suppress opposition as
soon as it appeared. Economic difficulties were piling up, and
the need for repression was becoming greater. Rationing of
sugar, charcoal and matches, begun in 1940, was extended to
rice early in 1941.
A HORSE TRADE

But the political struggle within Japan, even among its ruling
circles, was not settled by the Konoye government's actions.
On the contrary, it continued as strong as ever. A characteristic "deal" indicated the lines along which the struggle was
being fought. The military-fascist groups were unwilling to
permit a general election, due in 1941, to take place. On the
other hand, the moderates opposed moves to revise the Election
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Law and to strengthen state control over industry. In January
1941, a deal was made in which the extremists agreed to drop
these moves, while the moderates consented to let the Diet run
on without an election for one year, and to support the government's program in the meantime.
EXPANSION OR DEFEAT?

In the early months of 1941, Tokyo increasingly committed
itself to a policy dictated by the results of a decade of aggression. Since 1937 Japan had spent nearly 20 billion yen on the
war in China, or twice the total national debt in 1936. She had
suffered more than a million casualties, in killed, wounded and
diseased. In return for these great losses, she expected vast gains.
Thus "Greater East Asia" became the avowed goal of Japan's
foreign policy. To Japan's rulers, it represented the full flowering of the "bloc economy" idea. They now considered not
only Manchuria and China, but the whole of East Asia, necessary for such a bloc. The raw materials of southeast Asia, especially the oil, tin and rubber of the Indies and Malaya, were
needed to make up the deficiencies of a "J apan-China-lVlanchoukuo" bloc. But even with these rich prizes Japan would
not be entirely self-sufficient economically. She would still lack
high-grade machinery and certain other products. Nevertheless,
with the raw materials of East Asia firmly under her control,
Japan believed she would have sufficient bargaining power to
secure the foreign currency necessary for buying all she needed
in the world market.
Japanese statesmen continually stressed this idea of an East
Asiatic bloc in their speeches. To make its realization possible,
they concluded the alliance with Germany. Barring an outright German victory in Europe, however, the difficulties
which confront Tokyo's advance toward mastery of East Asia
are still formidable.
For Japan's economic resources are at a low ebb. Industrial
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production has begun to decline. Foreign trade is falling off,
and reserves of foreign currency are low. China is unconquered, and relations with the Soviet Union are uncertain.
The British Empire and the United States, which stand guard
over southeast Asia, are the mainstays of Japan's foreign trade.
By moving against them in that region, Japan. might risk everything gained thus far. For the first time, she would be staking
her future on a war with powers that control the seas and
access to world markets. She ,,,ould be facing all the dangers
that she successfully avoided in the World War of 1914-18.
Japan's geographical location, close to the scene of action in
the Far East, is still her great strategic advantage. Her economic
deficiencies have been, and continue to be, her main source
of w~kness. The ratio between these two controlling factors
may well determine the immediate future. Is Japan's new
Empire to reach out over immensely larger areas, or is it to
suffer its first great defeat?
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